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THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Today the world is in the midst of a cataclysmic
upheaval.. There is not a field of human thougbt or endeavor
tt~t is not going through a period of unrest and change. The
most prominent phase of this changing world is the struggle to
the doa t h between Totalitarian and Democratic ideologies. On
the one hand we have the concept that individuals can only be
free, and have an opportunity to develop as they should and
want to do, by being in abject and total subservience to the
state, and that all societies nlust also become vassals to one
supreme dominatjng state. On the other hand we have the con-
cept that the right to rule is derived from the just consent
of the governed, and tlmt each individual must be free to work
out his ovm destiny, and that all societies must be co-operative
that all may have a "place in the sun." Time alone will tell
which ideology is for a time to be supreme.
Closely allied to this political conflict is the eco-
nomic upheaval and the principles involved in both are primarily
the same. The 1~cbine age, with its mass production and col-
'V'"'lectible bargaining, has tended to suppress and subrrerge the
individual. In the midst of the struggle to find a new basis of
economy, bitterness, misunderstanding, and violent oppositions
of viewpoints run riot and add to the chaos of the total picture.
1
2Through the forces of the new economic order brought
about by the machine and mass production and its demands for
changed domestic coridd,tions, shifts of labor ~et ,~;etera,the
old picture of home life is radically altered. This fact,
grasped but slowly at first, today plays a vital part in the
thinking of sociologists, Church leaders, educators and all
those who are even r-emot.eIy affected by t:bis change at the
very core of our social life.
In religion the stress, while not so obvious, mani-
f'ests itself in the Church's loss of prestige and its evident
confusion. On the one hand the Roman Church stands steadfast
in the position it has held through the ages, and asserts that
the Church is totaltarian and through the Pope has absolute and
direct control of all human beings through out this life and
the life to come. On the other hand, opposed to this view,
stand the Protestants, but the opposition is not a unified one
and is split and torn inwardly. Today, Protestants are divided,
among many other things, over the question of'the "Individual"
versus the 11 Social" Gospel.
Educators face the task imposed by a divided world.
They must build a curriculum that will rneet the demands of the
day; and are f'aced wittlthe problem of'arranging 1t to suit and
satisf'y two warring factions, divided on the question of whether
the student is to be trained f'or individual or social ends.
All the soclal, economic, political, educational, moral,
and religious diff'iculties trmt interrupt the f'ree functioning
3of human beings in societies may be traced to a single
source - the age-long conflict between the individual and the
socLe.L organization of which he is a member. 1,~enhave not yet
learned how to live together. As soon as men collect in groups
friction arises; personal interests clash with other personal
interests; the concept of what is good for the whole group is
sought at the expense of the welfare of'the individual member;
the majority tries to rule the minority or small but privileged
classes seize control and play faction against faction and use
established custom and organized privilege for maintaining
their own place and power. Against these inequities the less
privileged member strives and struggles, and sometimes wins.
It is not so obvious but becomes clear,upon analysis,
that the specific cause of'such conflicts arises from diff'erent
conceptions, or definitions, of man and society. For while the
f'ormer is fixed in his nature, the latter is a construction
made by men. If society and its institutions are placed abso-
lutely foremost the individual is sure to be, first neglected,
then suppressed, then enslaved. Such is totalitarian society.
If, on the other hand, the individual person is conceived as
the supreme end for which all societies are formed, then we
have democracy, in principle at least. Furthermore, if the
welfare of the individual member is defined in spiritual rather
than in material terms, then there is a society that is some-
thing more than a mere group bent upon creating material wealth.
The divergence of viewpoint resolves itsel.f into the question -
is man a means to or is he an end in himself?
4From this it appears that the problem of this study is
one largely of' definition, but definition that arises out of
the fixed nature of human beings, and indeed out of his funda-
mental nature as a moral being. The whole point of vLew in
this thesis is thus summed up in - woo t is a per-aon t And this
viewpoint will give the needed insight into all that is to be
said. Naturally, then, the exaJ2Jinationwill be primarily, not
a sociological, nor theological, nor metaphysical study, but a
psychological one.
For an authorative expression of this viewpoint the
best is tr19.tODe given by Dr. Lightner V.J1tmer,some time Profes-
sor of Psychology in the University of Pennsylvania, who def'ines
and contrasts the field of' the physical sciences with that of
the mental scLeno e by saying: ,------
I
CI____/Gluman psychology is an examination of man's f7 spiritual nature. The unit of' observation iSla
! perf'ormance, but the unit of consideration is!person-
ality, defined by perfectibility of behavior ,I which
is measured or estimated in the unit of prog~ess
which men make toward the perfection they pr~fer.
The psychology of'man is not to be defined b
r
the
observed resemblance of human behavior of'ot_er ani-
mals, but rather bYffi\somedifferentiating cha acter
or characteristiCSQ~",l~D _______
'<
As every distinctive science must have its distinctive
concept or unit, psychology takes for its focus the concept of a
l1personall; and in that complex organism it takes, not his body,
primarily, but his consciousness, mind, and his self conscious-
ness. In this ,respect mental science is set off, definitely,
from the physical sciences .•
~11• Dr, L. Witmer, (;~~YChological Clinic, XVI. Nos. 1,2; Jan.
Feb. 1925 ' 'Cp
\
5In this conflict between society and the individual
it is easy to see that not everyone of his functions, but only
a limited number and k.l.nd are involved. Sinc e, obv Loua Lv , his
personal liberties are restricted, and such restrictions be-
come of vi tH1 importance when they affect his mor-al, c.har-ac ter,
which rests upon his f'r-eedom and will, at tention and study must
be given to human morality.
Fortunately, from simplicity of view-point, this does
not bring in another science different from psychology. For
many ethical teachers have, for a long time, infused into the
older metaphysical view of morality, a new and powerful factor,
basing it upon psychology.
No one states this approach more clearly than Professor
James A. Seth, who writes:Xl .
~thi~s, as the philosophy of conduct and char ct er-,
must be based upon a psychology or science of the
moral life 8 Inadequacies in ethical theol"Y ill be
found largely traceable'to inadequacy in the lli~der-
lying psychology. Kant, indeed, seeks to se arate
ethics from psychology, and to establish it
metaphysic of the pure reason. But even Kan 's
moral philosophy is based upon a psychology. Ab-
stracting from all other elements of man'sature,
Kant conceives him as a purely rational beig, a
reason energizing; and it is to this abstratness
and inadequacy in his psychology that we mus t trace
the inadequacy and abstractness of Kant's e hical
theory. It is impossible for ethics to esc pe psy-
chology; it is necessary for philosophy to ake
account here as elsewhere of scientific res Itse
As Aristotle maintained in ancient times an Butler
in modern, the question., (t What is the char-a teristic
excellence or proper life of man?' raises t
vious question, I'VtTha·tis the nature and con
of man, whose char~pteristic life and excel ence we
seek to describe?~l.
.~--"--" _ .._-----
James A. Seth, !_§_tu9x...._?!,.Ethical Pr!E:,ciples(2nd ed.
Scribners) 1894, p. 35
1
6Having suggested the presence of world conflicts in all
forms of human society, and having traced this warfare to a.
basic dlff'erence of interest between the individual person and
his group to a moral problem, resting upon man's psychological
nature, the background has been prepared for the statement of
this thesis. It is this:
The Kingdom of God as depicted by Jesus Christ is the
only human society that will effectually eliminate the conflict
between the individual and society.
To prove this thesis, the succeeding chapter's will pro-
ceed as the nature of the subject dictates. First, as the indi-
vidual human being is the fixed and unchangeable factor in this
problem, the first step w1ll be to give an adequate definition
of a person. Next, since his conflict with his fellows reaches
the very essence of his being when it touches his moral nature,
morality w11l be defined and it will be shown what that freedom
is, that a man must enjoy, in order to remain a moral being.
Specifically stated, Chapter II will be a study of
r • "Per son" in terms of psychology. Man, person, lm.dividual, person-
ali ty shall be us-ed. to express the same idea. Man will be defined
by what he does, and by what he 1s. The unit of consLder-a'tLon
will be a normal, rational person. The person will be~:~"c....:: in ;.i
the class organism. He will be shown to be different~ny
other organism in that he thinks, feels and wills, that his end
is that of his own moral perfection.
In Chapter III the unit of discussion will be that of a
self-directing orgru1ism, the Free Man, and this discussion will
7be a consideration of Freewill. The entire man will be viewed
in action. The individual will be shown to be a. creature of
his own choosing, tImt he has the power to and does make
choices in the alternatives presented to him.
Chapter IV will take into considera.tion the nature of
society. It will be viewed as a component part of the indi-
vidual. The conflict arising from prevailing concepts will be
defined and the inconsistencies of these concepts pointed out.
Finally, soci.ety sha.1l be defined in terms of function and
shown to be the same as that of the individual. The basis for
the reconciliation of this apps.rent conflict will be given, and
a statement as to why man has :failed to mak e this reconciliation
will be made. Next, since societies are formed by collections
of persons relating themselves together in various ways, society
will be defined, and the con:flict of the member, with his society,
will be traced to its source in the purpose of his social organi-
zation. The thesis will emerge when it is shown tl1...ata society
must always have a spiritual end or aim; this necessity growing
out of the natures of the men who :form it. Finally, it will be
shown that the Kingdom of God, now an Ideal, is tbe only society
that can ever reconcile the interests of society, as a whole,
with that of its members who are striving :formoral perfection.
Chapter V will be the climax of this study. For, with-
out altering the method of procedure, it will be shown how God
has revealed His Kingdom, both through the nature of man and
also tl~ough His Word, the one agreeing with and confirming the
other; or, perhaps a better statement would be to say, that
8
I .•,' '<~"" ~,I
revelation completes what ima.glnatlon, under the con+r-o L of
reason, 'builds up from observed facts of human nature and its
moral demands; builds up to a certain point, yet cannot make
perfect, even in thougr~e For the Kingdom of God is a Perfect
Society made up of Perfect Christians, neither one of which can
be conceived or comprehended by the limited mind of man. It
follows that only the Incarnation of God in the form of man,
and that the Perfect Man, could give to man a conception, ade-
quate, both to inspire his imitation and to guide him in the
slow process of realizing this Ideal in themselves. Thiswill be at
once both the theoretical and practical climax. of the thesis ,-the
presentation of a concept of a Perfect Society, arising out of
the nature of man and his needs.
f
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THR KINGDOM OF GOD
CHAPTER II
Person Defined
In order to under-stand the conflict between the indi-
vidual and society it is nec essar-y to establish a clear sta.tement
of what is meant by the term "person" for, out of' the conflicting
viewpoints, as to what a "person" really is, arises the problem
r: ",jI!~hatis the basis oflconsiderat'ion in this thesis. In this
_l __I, , ..·t,. i,r.
1_/J __t.l,\
chap ber- the individual will be cona:-lderedapart from society;
for, in a peculiar sense, he is isolated from his fellows and
the external wor-Ld in manners and degrees most baffling.
The word "per-eon" is interesting. In Lat:tn it means
II II d 11 11 11 11mask and consists of two wor s-- per, through and sona, sound.
The mask was worn by Greek actors in their out-door theatres to
indicate to the audience the crmracter they were portraying.
That the voice might be carried clearly and distinctly to the
listeners the lips of the mask :formed a small megaphone, so that
the voice of' the actor and hence the character depicted n sounded
tbrough" his lips in magni:fied volume. The Latin Church Fathers,
needing a word corresponding to the Greek word "hypostasis'! by
mistake, borrowed this word, "personal1 and used it in their dis-
cussions of the doctrines of the Trinity. While the early
fathers never defined persons in the sense of an individual being,
they did supply the word t~~t came to designate the individual
I
human being to whom Christianity had giVen such new prominence.
---~-----y-----------'~'---'"
C.C.J'. Webb, God and Perso:t_:lali:t;z(MoMillan Co.,19l8),
p. 40 ff.
--.-.---~--.----------
9
, .. iI".1
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revelation completes what imagination, under the control of
reason, 'builds up from observed facts of human nature and its
moral demands; builds up to a certain point, yet cannot make
perfect, even in thought. For the Kingdom of God is a Perfect
Society made up of Perfect Christians, neither one of which can
be conceived or comprehended by the limited mind of man. It
follows that only the Incarnation of God in the form of man,
and that the Perfect Man, could give to man a conception, ade-
quate, both to inspire his imitation and to guide him in the
slow process of realizing this Ideal in themselves. Thiswill be at
once both the theoretical and practical climax of the thesis ,-the
presentation of a concept of a Perfect Society, arising out of
the nature of man and his needs.
£.
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE KJNGDOM OF GOD
CHAPTER II
Person Defined
In order to under stand the conflict between the indi-
vidual and society it is necess8ry to establish a clear statement
til «! tof what is meant by the erm person or, ou of the conflicting
viewpoints, as to what a "person" really is, arises the problem
,> )
t~hat is the basis o~lcons:i.derat\ton~n,this thesis. In this
,-I \('.,1 Ii, i'.
chapber- the individual will be considered apart from society;
for, in a peculiar sense, he is isolated from his fellows and
the external wor-Ld in mann ez-s and degrees most baf'f'ling.
The word "person" is interesting. In Latin it means
" I' d 11 11 ""mask and consists of two wor s-- per, tl~ot~h and sona, sound.
The mask was worn by Greek actors in their out-door theatres to
indicate to the audience the crmracter they were portraying.
That the voice might be carried clearly and distinctly to the
listeners the lips of the mask formed a small megaphone, so that
the voice of' the actor and hence the c.ha.r-ac ter-depicted n sounded
through" his lips in magnified volume. The Latin Church Fathers,
needing a word corresponding to the Greek word 11 hypostasis'~ by
mistake, borrowed this word, "persona" and used it in their dis-
cussions of the doctrines of the Trinity. While the early
f'athers never defined persons in the sense of an individual being,
they did supply the word that came to designate the individual
1
human being to whom Christianity had given such new prominence.
_':...------- ,.-.-'--'--"---'~----- --~--..--..----------1
C.C.J. Webb, God and_Persol?-alitz (MoMillan Co.,1918),
p. 40 f'f'.
9
10
It is astonishing that the bein.g,s-ymbolized by the idea.
represen ted by the word IIpersonl! should, by many, be denied to
even exist. In spite of the fact that men in all ages have be-
lieved that persons do exist, and that everyone accepts the
testimony of our own introspective analyses that vro do think,
feel and will, some thinkers and many of them psychologists,
deny tha.t persons exist, that souls have any being at all, and
assert that consciousness is an illusion. Man is redu.ced to a
mere piece of machinery. He is made an automaton.
PSiLcho~ man lost his soul )and in B~ba Viol~ism he
In Wundt's .1 \ ?
lost his mind.. \
The origin of such an approach is of more value than is a
complete analysis of it. Such a view is inspired chiefly, if not
wholly, by devotion to that scientific nlethod which gathers all
its facts by observation of the senses (:::}ndthese negate or neg-
lect introspection) and which justifies its existence by its
I1being common lmowledge" shared in and used by all like-minded
beings. To succeed in that approach science must not contain any
knowledge that is strictly private and personal. It must be both
Communal and social. Obviously, a man I s OVID pnLvatie feelings,
thoughts and decisions are not open and exposed to the view of
such a science.. Therefore, some scientists blithely deny that
men have any such private property. Once the motive for this de-
nial of persons is thus exposed to view, the denials of conscious-
ness and mind need not be taken with any more seriousness than the
value of the motive, prompting such denial, determines. There are
many works presenting both sides of' this view that enlighten the
11
reader on how aridwhy such a concepf arose, but here the dis-
cussion is turned again to the tmiversally established belief that
persons are, that they are conscious in some sense which places
1
men above the level of mechanical playthings of'a jesting deity.
1See Encyclopedia Brit. (11 ed., 1911, V.30) Conway Ll. Morgan
who writes-three articles bearing on the subject: "Behaviorism"
(Vol. 30) 11 Inatinct" (Vol. 14) "Animal Intelligence" (Ibid) also
"Emergent Evolution" by C. L. Morgan (William and Norgate, 1925)
"Behaviorismll by John B. watson (W.W. Norton, 1929) "Man a Machine"
by Joseph Needham, 1929) WID. C.C. Dampier Wetham, "History of'
Science in Relation to Philosophy and Religion"(1929) brings the
subj ect up to date with many ref'erences. Sir Arthur Eddington in
"Nature of' the Externa.l World" shows that physics upon which op-
ponents of persons rely for their refutation, is itself nothing
more than the readings made by minds from dials.
12
The historic concepts of persons is interesting. Etienne
1
H. Gilson, in the Gif£'ord Lectures /' The Spirit of :Medieval Philos-
ophy", br-ae es the histor'y of the idea person in his lecture on
11 Chr lstian Personalism'~ He opens his duscussion by showing that
there is a conflict between the individual and collective societies,
and in prepari.ng the background for the consideration of this con-
flict, traces the idea of persons from the time of the Greek phil-
osophers onward. He points out that the Greeks "never denied the
reali ty of the indi vdduaL'' but contrary to the thought of the Middle
Ages ~ neither P'J;alto nor Aristotle ever "had a sufficiently high
idea of the individual." To Plato, "tb.e idea, Man, is eternal,
immutable, necessary, 11 but a man is but a mere reflection or" shadow
on the wall" cast by the idea. To Aristotle, the individual was
aCCidental, the species eternal. Thus, for Aristotle, the individ-
ual as such did not count, the thing of great importance was the
SpeCies, Man.
In the 13th Century, Duns Scotus defined the individual
as a person "marked with an individual character that distinguishes
hi:m. from all othersllwhile ThornasAquinas held that a person was
!~...<:___a being divided off from all other beings, and not itself di-
2
visible into other beings." This is but a reaffirmation of the
definition given by Boethius, the 6th century theologian, and has
been the commonconcept of theologians since that time.
1
Etienne
~val Philosophy"
Ibid .. ppl 92 -
H. Gilson, Gifford Lectures, "The Spirit of Wledi-
(c.scribners, 1936) pp 189 ff., R.A.H.C. Downes.
3198. Ibid. p. 204
13
Boethius, (486-524) the Sixth century philosopher, gave
us the classic definition in his well-1mown formula: "A person
is an individual substance of'rational nature." This definitj_on
is essentially the favored one of Christian theologians and is
1
still held by them. It is framed with man's moral responsi-
bility, here and hereafter in view; for the soul, or this indi-
vidual substance, is simple and cannot disintegrate. Hence, it
is immortal_,as it is rational; it is moral, and being both
moral and eternal, a man's moral responsibility nev,er ceases,
here or in the hereafter. Today, defining is no longer done in
terms of substance or-"substantiall -- an unknown and an unknow -.~
able Aubstance. Man, like all other things, is"what he does"
and so must be defined functionally.
The idea of' 11 persontl, while for a long time static, due
to the inhibition upon discussion, effected when Thomas Aquinas
became the official standard of'authority for the Roman Catholic
Church, is today a most import~ant and prominent concept; so
much so that a whole philosophy of 11 Personalism" has been bud Lt
upon it. The idea is treated in "The Philosophy of'Personalism'!
by Dr. Albert Knudson, who gives a brief historical review of'
the doctrine and quotes a nl~ber of definitions. He raises the
question - I1What is a Person?" - and asks, "Does por-aona l.Lt.y im-
ply self-consciousness? Does it imply freedom?" and contines
2
with a number of like queries.
Dr •.Albert C. Knudson, "The Philosophy of'Personalism"
(Abingdon Press, 1927) p. 83. 2. Ibid, p. 20
1
14
Then he quotes J • .M. E. McTaggart's assertion, "Nothing
1
exists but persons connected in a unity." But he rejects Mc-
Taggart's notion that "ultimate reality consist of a society of,
.~.;"\.. .....
persons, n on the ground that such a congeries has no unity 'i,.t_ it-
self but must rely upon some fundamental ill1ifier,and that it
has no real freedom, of which he says, IlFreedom is usually
singled out as one of the most important characteristics of per-
2sonality." He continues the discussion by consideration of the
views of William stern, Leibnitz and others, until he arrives at
his own conception in his section headed, liThe Concept of Person-
3
ality."
starting with the definition g1ven by BoethiuE'ppreviously
stated, he discusses the various shades of opinion of this defini-
tion as held by othe1""s,and sums up the composition of a person as
consisting of four "fundamental" elements: the first, individuality,
which includes unity and iden tity; secondly, self- consciousness, in
the sense of the power to know as well as to feel (or be conscious
of); the third, will or free activity; and the fourth, dignity or
4
-----~--------- ..- .._-----
worth.
1
Dr. Albert C. Krmdson, "'l'hePhilosophy of Personalism, n
(Abingdon Press, 1927) p. 22.
, <:/1
:;If ..c : . 2 .
'., f, ,c' ~ p , 24.
FI ~ t, i:' '-1-/
" 37"r
~pp 78-87.
4 -:it
Dr. Knudson gives nwnerous additional sources for further
reading from which he quotes directly.
15
Out of these definitions we offer the following in-
elusive statement -- A person is a self-conscious, self-direct-
ing organism, consisting of a soul, (spirit)J a mind (conscious-
ness) and a body, originated by organic creation and functtoning
for the moral perfection or integratj_on and development of the
1
man.
This definition satisfies the scientific procedure of
first placing the l1thinglldiscussed,in a class, giving its
species. The origin and development, in a genetic sense, is of
no material interest in this study, ~~,~I~leneed:-'givei{c)itspecial
consideration to the body. Our defining will be done, as stated
before, in terms of function, except for minor considerations
tha t will be pertlnent to the under'standing of the whole person
in action.
tb 1 If "Having placed man in .ec ass organism we must next
form a concept of his composition. Man is an organic whole,
"an organization of component elements, that make up a living
body, capable of separate descriptions, but mutually dependent
2
upon each other,ll which agrees with James' statement that per-
3
sonality"is a composite organization of several selves."
-------_ ..----"._._--- .--.-----
1Arthur Holmes, "Psychology of Preaching, 11 (Mimeograpb.ed
1940) p. 4.
ism.
2
Web_~ters Internation~l Dictio~ary - Definition of organ-
_/,I>
3
-'/1/1
William James, "Principles of Psycho1ogy'! Chapter XVI
P. 292 ff'
16
r I
As ''i~~~~{he'expectoo, psychologists have t.akeri persons
more seriously than any of the mech.anis tic sc i.eutists • Some,
however, Cnmongst them the behavioris ts who carry the mechani-
cal mode of defining to the limit) describe man as merely com-
posed of Lnrie r-L ted and acquired reflexes constl tut1_ng the behavior
of the body as a whole. This method does define functionally, or
by what the body does, and not merely structually, by that of
which it is made up, but C:::-andsome of the behaviorists have gone
to t}lft' extrel'1e) such a psychology, describing men as machines,
finds no need of consciousness, and calmly, deliberately, boldly
proceeds to divest the miman being of such an apparently useless
1
appendage~.d.- an act that seems almost unbe.La.evs.b.Le but true.
Among the psychologists who have seriously attacked the
problem of man's composition, the late William James was, as
usual, both picturesque and lively in bis talk about persons. His
treatment presented a tremendous advance in thinking over that of
the early Boethius and his followers, who made personality a ha.rd
and fast simple substance, unshatterable and eternal. James,
makt.ng his beginning with a br-ead and sweeping stat ement of his
conception of a person, or self, sald:
._-_._-
~l1~~-~~"~rl";~,10~~"~B.-"';J~~ (w. «, No1"ton Co..1929 )
For man as a machine, ~'-es~D;-Uf5'tO:rr, "Atheis:rn,tlHast. Ene.
R);:'ligion and Ethics, Vol. II, pp 175 1'1'. ~
~ 1Piilliam James, ll.E.E,1nc!l?_lesof Psycbol0.RiY," (1890) Part 1,
Chap , v. '\ A,', )01.<'"'' "'.
La Mettri~, 1I~ Aut01!l~Om'l'heory," pp 128-144
Joseph Needham, ~.z ~ ~'Sin~(1748) 11 Iv1an,~y~chi~,n
1927.
17 \
o \
~"In its widest possible sense a man's self is tBe sum-
total of all that he can call his, not only hiS\bOdY
and his ps ycrid,cpowers, but his clothes and his .house ,
his land and horses, his yacht and bank account '~hiS
reputation and his wor~s, his wife ru~d children, his
anc est or-s and friends .('!Jl _ro
This definition is different from both the popular notion
of a person limited essentially to a "personality" and Boethius'
indivisible "iubstance'~ According to J-ames, a person is a complex
compound, made up, not only of many visible constituents but of
many invisible elements, and a mind that reaches far out into the
world about him. From material so gained he builds himself
"no-bIer mansions" or a larger world and identifies himself' with
it; so that where the one leaves off and the other begins, no one
v can discern -- any more than they discern and distinguish a man's
-- D,-'" ..» ,
heart, brain and perhaps even his clothes 9.1."10 the man himself'.
This idea is expansive and suggestive; it renews and transforms
the old problem of morality and free-will and man's place in 80-
cietY_;:-.thebasic consideration of this thesis.
Dr. Cbarles R. Judd has a similar concept of personality.
To him, man is not only II the center of the wor-Ld';he is also a
conscious center, so that "the full concept of self' must include
2
every possible relation." As a consequence, all men taken together,
,
_.---------------- --------------
1
1Nil1iarnJames, II Principles,/t~~------
Iy ')
2Charles H. Judd, "~cbol~'! (C. Scribners, 190'7) p , 310 ..
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have in their minds the universe of perceived things and the
relations between them. Each man, being like other men, thus
builds his own world, which is himself, with God, who unites
all these worlds together in a ID1iverse. The world thus be-
l
COITleSa world of selves or persons, human and divine.
"Properly speaking," James has said, "a man has as many
selves as there are individuals who recognize and carry an
2
image of him in their mind." From this it is obvious that
man extends and expands himself' enormously.
< IIPersons are both born and made. the stuf'f'" out of which
the rational, moral man is to be made, COmes at birth. How much
the finished product is due to heredity and how much to environ-
ment and how much to educat1.on involving ideals and their choice,
is a mooted question. 'Moreover, it is not of primary cons::tdera-
, ·1-
.....,,,; c "t~,~tion at this·.Mme. At first, the conscious processes of the in-
fant's thinking, feeling and willing are guided by his animal-
like appetites and inborn instincts. But tl~se conflict amongst
themselves. As the child growS he tries to introduce into them
some order and harmony, so that he does not at one moment seek a
certain end, and the next moment act so as to destroy that end.
-- - _- - - ._-_ .._-_._--_ .._.- -----------------1 -.- ....---
For several concepts of man similar
~~T1]..ePhilosop!!y_~.:r..Personalism,ll (1927) pp
pp 75~ on 11 Personalism and the World.1I
to this - see Fnudson's
30 ff and especially
One who does that is irrational, insane, maniacal, or merely non-
rational. The growing person) quite naturally, strives for
rational conduct. The intelligent person, therefore, is one who
forms 0.11 idea of what he wants to accomplish and proceeds to at-
tain that objective by means and methods which he judges will use
the least energy in its attainment.
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The extent to which man can develop is unlimited. It
is evident bhat man cannot be limited to the contours of his
body. He eorrtLnua L'Ly reaches out a-nGbeyond them.. By his in-
ventions he steps out and roams far and wide in the extension
of his influence. Is not the voice of the singer, located at
the loud speaker, the same as it is located at his lips for
those who are in his bodily presenc~here is the voice of one
speaking over the long distance telephone? Anyone feels a
table top at his fingers' end~if he places it there. If,
however, he touches it with a pencil it is at the pencil's tip.
Thus has man extended himself) as"with a canEj',,'at "the end of a
can evand so on inde:finitely. All of man's inventions have ex-
tended his sphere of influence immeasurably and there is no
end in sight o:f this enlargement. In a literal sense, as truly
as a man is present in every part of his body, he is where he
is actively conscious and reaches as far as do his perceptions.
Not only does man do this but he brings forward the
past and welds it into the present and with the :future makes
one indivisible whole. Today, men are making decisions, con-
sciously and distinctly, because of pr-omi.ses m&i'-t made years ago.
Thus, they acknowledge that the perSOrf(w'homade the promise then,
still lives and must fulfill it. Equally, men are planning the
future and are busy with matters that, did they believe time
would cease ere their possible fruition, they would end the
planning and doing imrnediately. Our intentions which are now
foresights, or insights into the future, bind that :future into
20
the present which is already botmd into the past, and thus make
man" not a mecnanical, but a spiritual product of a distant past,
and equally, to a degree at least, a fore-ordainer of the future
1
man.
This view gives prominence to the unlimited extension of
every person who is the center of his conscious world, now prac-
tically unlimited, and of the real world in which, as Einstein
has pointed out, each man, since he is the observer, is the
2
center.
The origin of man is not of essential interest to a study
that deals with man's moral nature; for the validity of an activ-
ity, or of a thing, does not depend upon its origin. This belng
so, there is no value in describing or considering all the earlie~
and now discarded doctrines of man's lIevolutionllwhich described
his lIdescent" as an lfascent" from lower stages. The present-day
t '
doctrines of man's origin -- areation versus Evolution have
combined in organic-creation. Here God's work appears in the for-
ma tion of every individual, making him something other than any /,-)'(I_'
of'his nrrt ec ederrt s v or the sum total of' them all, something unique,
----- --------'----'---'-_ .._-
1For fur'ther study and elaboration of this phase of'a
person, see Borden P. Bovme" ~IP~l::'_:ol<?.n~lismL"(Houghton Mifflin,
1908) also Sir Henry Jones, "A.Ja_:htb:_:~hatEn~l~lireSt_,"(Gi:f:ford
Lectures, MacMillan Co. 1922) Lecture IX, X, especially pp 114 ff.
:2
Sir James Jeans, 1I~.~l)-;y").~Y:," (Encly,:_~~.: 11th ad.
Volume 5) p , 32 /New
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d:tff'erel1t~,from any other person on earth. Man stands not at
the end of'a long sel"'iesof' chain-linked events, but rather, in
(,!
x~! ':i'iTs glory and uniqueness, as the crowning act of creation.
Sir ,Henry Jones insists that a "man is what he does",
and this truth holds most emphatically in the realm of'morals •
.A man is moral or immoral only and wholly -- not in the "stuff'''
he is made of', nor in the structure of'his mind or body, but in
the wa.y he wills and acts. This fact is of importance in study"
ing the individual's place in society and his freedom to choose
and act morally. "In fact," Jones says, "mora_lity is a process."
He points out that in order to be at all,w1l1 must -be in operation.
If men cea.se to will what 1s right the moral world would cease to
exist. All sp1±:dtua.lfacts imply a similar condition, the spir-
itual world being a constant creation. The world of ideas is one
in which rational persons carry on the processes of intelligence.
The moral world is the world made by the process of active voli-
tions of' rational beings, seeking to convert what is~ into whab
should be, or to realise their ideals. Man truly is what he does.
He is characterized by his thinking, f'eeling and his willing. He
actually exists in these operations and extends as far as they ex-
2
tend -- without knoIDl limits, in an inf'inite sphere of being.
~ ..-------~... -.~.-------,_-~.--.......-------- ..--.-~-"-..-.'-- '''_'
1James Sully, "Ev91~ltior~tI(Encly. Brit. 11th ed ,) gives
history o-r this doctrine down to time of' Conway L. Morgan, IIEmer-
~ent Evolution'! ( Gifford Lectures, 1922) --
.-- ._--- 2 ' !~< ~1
Sir Henry Jones," A_,Fai_~h._!;_ha.t Enq,':l.~r~s,,i pp 124 re,
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"Man is never satisfied with what he is, or with his
present mode of conduct.. Always he aspires to be what he is not,
as Longfellow laments -
"0, that a man would arise in me
That the man I am might cease to be."
More hopefully Lowell asserts -
"The thing we long for,
That we are for one transcendent moment .."
And Browning, in a braver spirit and more robust faith, declares -
"W'hat I aspired to be and was not, comforts me, !I
and assures us,
"All that is, at all,
Lasts ever past recall
Earth c~es, but thy soul and God stand sure,
1/l/hat entered into t.q.~~.,. ..
Wha t was and is and~:sliallbe.
Time's wheel runf back and stops; Potter and clay
endure ."
From this review of the meanings given to that familiar
word IIperson" it is evident tl1a.tthe human individual is a factor
of' almost unlimited significance to modern philosophy. Thinkers
have just bogun.; seriously to study man as a person. For the impet-
us first given by Christianity to the concentration of attention up-
on this cen tel" and circumference of the universe was, unfortunately,
later diverted to other ttdngs by historic influences.
Christian theologians from 100 to 450 were occupied, chief-
ly, if not wholly, with purely philosophical concepts of the nature
of'God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit, ending in Nicean Trinitarian-
l-', ..~t ~, «>. c rism.,A~or,tdl.\factor is this diversion of a.ttention a.way from the
,.__ .- -.----~--".--. .--- ----_------
1The verse quotations in this essay, where not otherwise
indicated, are taken .fronlJ.ohnBartlett, (Little, Brown & Co. 1909)
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person to other matters th9:twere of no significance in the
teachings of Jesus; ,,In fact, a step that he taught against
most clearly when he said, "Render unto Caesar the things that
are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's,'! came about
as a result of the Church's absorption into the Roman Empire. In
that absolute, totalitarian and militaristic system of Rome, a
person was reduced to a virtual zero. Just as soon as the state
was supreme in every thi.ng, the Church, as a bureau of that state,
was imbued with like concepts. August1ne, because of his notion
of his own conversion and his leaning toward the Platonic philos-
ophy ( that paid some attention to the nature and destiny of man)
divided his genius between the Church and the individual. He
magnified, however, the sovereighty of God by predestination, un-
til, in the sight of religion, man sank again into co:mparitive. (V
\.._.-' -'
insignificance. Later, during the period of the Reformation,
Cal'vin completed man's degradation by the elaboration of the
theory of foreordination. "
rt .. , 1,'1. ,1, . t
At about tIns time1mechanistic science, beginning with
the n I think, therefore I am" of Des Cartes, was beginning to
take form, but was speedily depersonalised and eventually went
so far as freely to deny man any reality whatever t- a view
n-eapt~iLyendorsed by some Neo-Hegelians like F. A. Bradley and
I
Bernard Bosanquet •
.--- _" --- ..- -------- ..--.--- ------.----
1See A. C. Knudson, II Philoso-ohx_of Personalism," (1927)
p , 31 sr, who lists Absolutists--who'-'accept""and deny-'the Person-
ality of the Absolute.
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Medieval serfdom, also ecclesiasticism, theology, philos-
ophy and modern science haye all conspired to deny the worth of
man as revealed in the Bible and especially in the teachings of'
9'1"Jesus who placed him above any society, any state and depicted him
as the very flower of God's creation, and the thing of supr-eme
value in the universe.
'~\"!l,-J'<J
M-a.-n, 'Being a mo r-a L being, ms value depends directly upon
his goodness or badness)and it is by these standards that he is
judged throughollt the Bible.-:.._which places him on two distinct
levels. On the lower level the inspired ~riters paint himk hope-
less, corrupt, utterly unable to lift himself' to the plane he
confesses and desires. Because, "that every imagination of the
thoughts of'his heart was evil continually," he is suitable only
1for destruction. But on the higher level God sees men with their
potentialities realized, as but little lower than "elohim" (angel)
being formed af'ter God' s own image when He was Creator, a t the
2
climax of his work, and he is pleased with him. Men are indeed
corrupted but, "in every form of the human, some hint of the High-
3
est dwells," and this latent power,"built into him by God," this
ideal tlmt a man longs to become, this spark of divinity never
extinguished, can be realized.
For these reasons the Bible weighs ma.n and names him,
according to his worth in the sight of God. He is called ~I!living
s ou'l," (Genesis 2:'7) made in the "ima.ge of' God, (Genesis 1;2'7)
Gen. 6:5; 8;21; Job 15:16.
2
1
Ps. 8;4; 144:3; Reb. 2:6. Luke 2:14.
3
Phil. 2:13.
2;5
the mona.rch of'all the earth (Genesis 1:26 ) endowed with the power
to choose evil or good ( Genesis 3:5) and to obey or disobey. (Gene-
sis 3:12)
When Jesus trod the shores of'Galilee he proclaimed that
he came to seek that which was lost. But the brief'est of glances
at the social conditions of'that day revealsx cogently~ that the
concept of'man, as a Divine image,,,-precious in the sight of God, a
free moral agent, had indeed been lost. Totalitarian Rome ruled
the world with an iron fist. At best, men were but "cives" or
citizens, "milites" or soldiers; human life was chea.p, of little
if any value, except as it served the purpose of'state •
. " I~ • ~ , ~ , • •
The priesthood of Aaron was;I u;t..t;,e.r~J.:.y corrupted. From
servants of'God and leaders of men they had made the Temple a "den
of'robbers and thieves," class distinctions were rampant, man had
become mere hopeless II tioo Ls" and pawns of'the rulers. When Jesus
placed the individual above the Sabbath, when He decisively ref'used
to join the cliques tlmt were longing to revolt and become the
political rulers of tb.eworld) when He chose rather to serve, to
inspire and renew the latent hopes and aspirations of' the leper,
the blind the lame and the poor, the "whited sepulchers" were so, ,
enraged they gnashed their teeth in hatred. Then they s oughb., to
)I, ,'e- I annihilate, by _Orucif'ixion, the Son of'Man" who had come to pro-
claim the Kingdom of God and the glad tidings that "God so loved
the world that He gave His only begotten Son that wJ.1Qao ev ar-be-
lieveth on Him should not perish but have life eternal."
----------,. __ .._--------_._' ,.-----,_ ..,---_.- ,------ ..-,-~-.,,-.----
1
John 3:16.
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For a time, an unfortunately long time, the pagan con-
cept of Aristotle, who later was regarded by the Church as an
almost infallible thinker, prevailed. Aristotle's judgment was
.' ~ ...
that of the upper classes of his day, and was the prev~1'ent con-
cept accepted by all classes. He saw man, not as having any
eternal value - an equali t'Ybetween man and man - but surrounded
by slaves and sycophants of the ~urt of King Philip, where he
was engaged as !utor for Alexander tIle Great. He saw "the human
average as nearer tile beast than gcd ," II From tll.ehour of their
birth some are marked for subjection, others for comJ11and.""He
who can foresee," sagely remarks Aristotle, lIis intended by
nature to be lord and master." ~ome men, for him, have no abso-
lute value, but are means to other'men's ends, to be used or
spent as their' mas tel'S see fit. "The slave is a tool , 'with lif'e,"
( a horribly cruel concept) "the tool is a lifeless slave." "He
who can work only with nf.s hands is by nature a slave."
His crovming cynicism relates to women -- "She is un-
finished man, she will be the las t thing ever civilized by man •••
her will is weak and she should remain silent in the presence of
1
,finished males' '! These judgments would be humour-cus, if'we did
not at times, at certain periods of history, have men reverting
to type, who, like Napoleon, made use of men as tools for his own
;I) --
ambition, or like the cynica.l Bismarck, view the common people as
mere IIcannon fodder e "
............... .----.-- ...-...~.~.~ ..- --.------~_-_. _.__ ..__ ..----~------.-----
1Aristotle's Politics, quoted by Will Durant, "starLof
Ph"llosophy" ( Garden City Pub. N.Y. 192'7) --_
The prediction of Christ, however, tl:J.at "And I if I be
I '
1ift d '11 d 11 t IT TT 1 1_ e up sns raw a _ men un 0 me, y_._as ow y, and relent-
lessly, chariged the world's estimate of a person, and the mean-
2
ing and worth of the individual; until today, in the best thought
of the times, though he may not build it, he does occupy the known
world, from its center to its circnmference ..
From this study of personality there has come a concep-
tion widely different t~! that held by certain scientists, and
even theologians. The conclusions reached are based upon both
authori ties and upon the commonobservation, which any man, any
where, anytime, can make, both upon hims elf and upon thos e about
him. A full definition of a person must include, first, his as-
signment to a class, organism, secondly, in which he is distin-
guished f'r-om others in the class, organism, -- by his self-con-
sciousness; and thirdly, by hd.s pecu Lf.a r and unique striving for
self-betterment, which separates him, with an impassable gulf, from
the lower animals whf eh struggle for mere existence and the repro-
duction of their kind.
It is man's urliversal striving fOI' self-betterment that
makes him a moral being. For he finds that all that he labors for
as ends, are eventually used for improving his spiritual nature.
-::------------_ .._--_. _._-_._------_. --
1
J'ohm 12:32
_2
See Ha.stmgs Dictionary of the Bible, (1906) Man, VIII,
p. 225. J'. 'Hastings; W.F. Adeney. The word person does not occur
in the English Bible. Cf Philosophy, ib. P 848, T.B. Kilpatrick.;
and Psyc,hology, Tb, IV. pp 1633 ff, J. Laidlaw, which bears on this
subject,~
1-
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To set before any man the ambition to secure a million
dollars, j\lst to spend upon his animal appetites and instincts,
would be appalling, even to him, and th088 who do scramble fOl'
money and use it largely upon their bodies, eventuallw discover
"to their despair, omar-t s assur-ance -
"A jug of Wine ,I Loaf of Bread and 'I'hou
Beside me singing in the Wilderness
0, Wilderness were a Paradise enow,'{
is a result of that deceitfulness of sin that always reaps such
despair. It is certain, that a person, to be a person at all,
must be moral, must be rational, or able to form an ideal of the
man he wants to be, must be free to strive for constant progres-
sion toward the realization of the chosen ideal within himself.
With the image of what he longs to be ever before him,
he realizes it step by step, and with each step of progress, he
finds a better and more appealing, a more desirable image appear-
ing before him. His progress on earth is never finished. These
processes of moral progress, edification, aanc.t.Lf'Lca t.Len, educa-
tion,et cetera, eonstantly continue and lead him on toward the
ideal of perfection.
To sUJ.TlInarize:Man is a peculiar animal, a unique being,
a most complex organism, different from any other earthly thing,
in that he thinks~ feels and willS, and more, he 1k:nowsthat he
does it and also directs it. By that thinking he forms ideas of
things that are not in existence and fills the world with his in-
ventions and social organizations. Moreover, he possess an ideal
of the person he wishes himself to be. That ideal is the image of
a morally perfect man. 'Not only has he ideas but also emotions
made up of appetites, instinctive feelings, developed sentiments,
and from these arise a Divine discontent, that urges him always
away from his "lower" self to a "higher" self, not yet here, but
which he wills to bring into existence e To choose the.t ideal,
to use myriads of possible means to that end, man must be free,
freer than plants and animals, free as a moral being. This free
man will be the subject of our next succeeding chapter.
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD
CHAPTER III
The Morally Free Man
To show" that the Kingdom of God is the only society
that a person may enter and remain a person, with no conflict be-
tween hirrlselfand the society, a full study of'person must be
made. In Chapter II, man's natUl~e was studied. He is a large
and complex, self-conscious, self-direct:1.ngorganism. His sel.f-
consciousness and his self'- direction enable him to .form an ideal
of'the kind of a man he would like to be. That is the basis of'
his morality. A person must be a moral man. But, to be moral,
he must be .free to strive .for the attainment o.fa chosen ideal or
end; it is the consideration of that freedom to which attention
is directed in this chapter.
To be moral, man must be free, to some extent, from effi-
cient, physical causes. Hence, while person, morality and freedom
cannot be actually separated, for purposes of description this
chapter naturally .falls into two parts -- the moral man and the
free man, both united in a person. This Qnion is not always made
clear. Such terms as man, self , individual, ego, ar-e sometimes
used in the same sense as person, and again in general senses.
1Il\1anl!.for example, when it is used to include infants and abnormal
people, 1s a broader term than person, and does not designate a
moral being. Dr. Albert C. Enu.dson makes clear this distinction:
,,,.,, ...__._-------------------
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"The words self' and person are sometimes used synony-
mously, and properly so. But strictly, person is a
narrower te nne It applies only to selves that have
attained to a certain degree of intellectual and moral
development; a slave 1s not a person, neither is a
child.. Personality implies moral responsibility and
freedom .."I
Personality implies morality and morality implies free-
dom.. Are men .free? I.fso, can they remain morally free and still
be members of a society? The solution o.fthis problem is the ul-
timate goal of this thesis, and with it in mind, we will first
consider a man's morality, to see its nature, composition, deriva-
tion and value.
In Chapter II, man was defined as a self-conscious organism
and it was shown that he is composed of spirit ( soul) mind or
consciousness, and a body_ A consideration of the body will be o-
mitted, for it is an instrument, devoid of moral freedom. It is,
to a large extent, a piece of machinery, bringing in news of the
external wor-Ld , through the senses to the spirit, and carrying out
the spirit's commands to that same world of things. As the spirit
thinks, .feels and willS, and this activity itself constitutes the
mind or consciousness, the spirit is not innnediately dealt with.
Instead, a study is made of the processes of thinking, feeling and
willing, to see if they exhibit that freedom from necessi~y, and
have liberty of choosing, which is necessary to moral man.
The common consent of mankind has held that insensate
things a.re not moral. Neither are the lower animals which act
1
A. C. Knudson, "Philosophy of Personalism," (1927) p , 63.
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instinctively, without having in mind any idea of the ends to be
1
accomplisbed. 1;)'01" are Lnf'ants, idiots or people af'f'lictedwith
certain physical def'ects and diseases, hel.dmorally responsible.
Only man, of all creatures on this earth, displays the capability
to be a moral being, and then in only oertain of'his actions. In
shor-t , only persons in the true sense of that word, are moral
beings. They perform many actions, some of which are moral.
Reflexes, automatic acts, instinctive acts,performed for
the first time, and instinct1ve, mechanical habits, however ac-
quired, done without consciousness, are all forms of human be-
havior which are excused from moral accountability. Only those
ao.t.Lons that are voluntary, ideatior:al, rational, intentional and
deliberate are beld to be moral acts •. Each of these actions is
complex, composed of some desire or felt want. (The latter embody
an idea. of what is desired and of the means by which it may be
secured, a.lso the power to secure the end or to satisfy the desire ..)
They are ideational because the agent has an idea of the end he
seeks; rational, because he does realize the end sought. 'llostrive
for the end man must be free from obstacles in the way, and at
libert"1 to pursue the end.he has in mind. This is the freedom
required for moral action.
It is admitted that all persons do strive fOI' ends and
thus are counted as moral beings. But for what do men strive?
What is the ultimate end of their labor? Obviously, they seek
myria.ds of' quickly obtained ends, but these a.re Lmn-edd.ately turned
1
William McDouga.ll, 11 0l~:tli~~ .~-f__Soci~1:.s_Xghol~g_71'~(1908)
discusses instincts.
into means to secure another end and so the process goes on ill1til
it arrives at; some ultimate end which is never a means to more
ends. Such ends are called 11moral enda'l What are they?
The centuries of study,since Socrates, has confirmed the
statement of'P'Labo, in "Pha.edr-ua'' and "Protagol"acS;'that no man
ever deliberately strives to injure himself. If, in a fit of
insanity, rage, or intoxication from liquor, or from religious
fanaticism, he does injure his body or his character, he does it r:
- either because of'uncontrollable f'orceSr + in which ca.sehe is not
morally r-e spons Lb'Le , / or to gain some future benefit. Socrates
taught thB_t no man voluntarily pursues evil or tha.twhich he
thinks is evi.l. To prefer evil to the good is not human nature.
Man must always seek what he feels is ~ his own apparent good
1
in his earthly life. With this, F. H. Bradley agrees, saying,
2
itA purely evil self is a sheer impossibility." Man always
chooses deliberately what he believes will best satisfy the de-
sires he fe els.
But many of the ends that men strive for and call good
are merely means to other ends. They labor to change their phy-
sical environment, to invent machines for bodily comfort, to pro-
vide the necessities of'life, to obtain education')to form soci-
eties for their own protection and enjoyment. But these are
------_ ... _ --- •• ------ ••---.-----.--~---- •• --" >•• _ ••---_ ••• _--
1
See Ene. Brit.(9th Ed.1892) Ethics, H. Sidgwick, Vol.8,
p , 576, rr
2
Joseph A. Leighton "Individual and Society';(D.App1eton,
1926) quotes F.Il. Bradley, If Ethical Studie? 1878---~-~--.-- .~ ... ---
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always means to some other end. Men, possessing them, still
crave and strive for sometl1ing else. No matter how luxurious
their physical surroundings, no matter how enormous their wea.Lbh,
no matter how elevated their moral character in their own and
other peoples'eyes, as long as they live men are unsatisfied and
continue to strive for ideals approachable but never reachable.
The ultimate ideal that men strive to attain is that of
the morally perfect man. No person is a means to an end; a man
1
1s an end to himself. He is an integra ted man jolt:: one in whom
emotions, intellect and will all work r.L9.rmoniouslytogether, so
that no discord aue to internal friction, mars the man's inner
serenity. He finds himself working smoothly and efficlently to
obtain what his heart desires, because it is so in accord with
his own conscience. If his ends and means are in accord with his
fellows in society, then he enjoys external peace also.
Beyond all other ends lies the Absolute End., his own
moral perfection the completed man 4-i who retains his inner
integration like an evergreen tree, that keeps its shape tn~ough
all the years of its growth, in height, circumference and content.
Just SO the integrated man, with his Ideal before him,
grows toward completeness and does it without conflict within, nor
See Immanuel Kant, "Cri·t~.g.£e_<?f2:r'acticalReason", tr.
Thomas K. Abbott ( Longmans Green & Co. 1909)
1
insuperable obstacles without.. This is bhe moral man, not yet
1perfect, but successfully striving for perfection.
If a moral being is one who can be guided by ideas of
the consequences of his acts before they take place, if he can
foresee wha b will come to pass, he, of all men, would be the
most miserable, if he could do nothing to avert impending calama-
ties to himself and his loved ones, and could not as much as lift
a finger to attain the good that he concieves. To be moral he
must not only have th~s power to foresee consequences, thereby
rightl'Y judging his course, bub he must actually be free and able
to perform any necessary operations to fulfill the needs of his
jUdgments ..
Many arguments have been used to deny just this kind of
freedom, to use means to ends desired, and even to prove that
men are not free at all. The most determined opponent of this
concept is that of scientific determinism. Before pr-oc eedf.ng to
further define moral freedom we must determine that it is both
possible and a reality.
Science demands, not only an absolute necessity, but
physical necessity, and not only physical necessity, but that
kind of unif'ormity that comes from a chain of efficient causes,
that, as James remarked, reaches from primeval chaos to the crack
of doom, events geared together like cog-wheels; interwoven like
chain mail; lock-stepped like"caterpillarsllon tractors.
~
Sir Henry Jones, "A Faith that EnSluires,"(1922) Ch.X
Moralali ty - A Process tha t~nwals' Attains .;pp 1:'18-135, Also see
H. Sidgwick, "Methods of Et~,-ics,ton "PERFECTION1~
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The meaning of this deterrninism has been stated by many writers;
among the more recent ones is Sir Henry Jones, who gLves a very
clear and emphatic statement of the issuee He says -
liThe problem of freedom is held to be the problem of
natural cause and causality means the transmutation
of energy from one form to another, according to fixed
quantitative laws, which physical science defines. No (-
other kind of connection is conceived in this controversy.'
In the imagination of the modern scientist the world is
a vast machine. Its parts are so geared together that when one
moves, all of them move. The first moving pa.rt is the cause; the
part it moves is its effect. In terms of motions of matter in
space, the mechanist seeks to describe each and every event in all
the unlimited universe. This aim, astonishing as it may seem to
anyone who takes his science chiefly from glowing accounts of its
applications to human health and comfort, and to inventions that
save human labor and give men new command over nature, is, never-
theless, the pur-pose that guides researchers in their quests, and
determines so many of the bewildering beliefs held by men whose
world is nothing but II atoms and the void'~ That it has been aban -
doned,by many thinkers, as an inadequate and di.storted picture of
the actual world, does not preclude its use as a mechanical Ideal
which many earnest souls seek to realize. It is this view of the
world that rigorously exorcises all human freedom from human ac-
tion and makes man a mere bundle of inherited or conditioned re-
1Henry Jones, itA Faith That Enquires," p. 105
1
flexes, set going by physical stimuli.
The scope of'determinism is, by several writers, seen to
include, not only every particle of matter in the universe which
has its path forever determined for it,i::mt more by the use of
LaPlace's lIPerfect Calculatorl1 it can be located at any future
moment. Such an ideal is indeed :fascinating, but a specious one.
Nobody has ever exactly calculated even the solar ecli.pses with
perfect exactness. But the craving for the power to prophesy 9.n(1
the necessity of the postulate of determinism are so strong that
scientists erect a Mec.hanf.ce.L Ideal World, wherein, theoretically,
but never actually, things happen as determined by the hypotbesis-
es, but then use that imaginary hypothetical concept to crush out
2
all freedom of will and tll.usall human morality 8
Modern Inductive science was impelled by two needs to re-
ject final causes or purposes, in its descriptions, and to restrict
its own explanations to efficient physical causes alone. The first
reason arose out of the Locld.an theory, that all f'acts observed
must come tbrough tb.e senses, That single process restricted sc:i:ence
1
Por this view well treated see ENe. BRI'll. 11th Ed. Mechan-
ics, For opposing views see James Ward, 11lJ_~turalism& Agnosticism."
(1899) I, II, and the works of the pragmatJ.sts, humanists, and per-
sonalists, together with such phYSicists as Sir Arthur Eddington,
Sir James Jeans and others who have adopted the new views of the
world.
2
See James Ward, "N~ture.~ism and Agnosticism'; (Cambridge
Press )1899, Vol. I, p , 41; 13.1soseeliAtheism';Charles B. Upton,
H.E.R.E., II pp 174 ff for mechanism and refutation. A.B. Bruce,
"!p>olo~etiC?~,;q1896) is lal"gely devoted to the refutation of ma-
terial stlc mec narid sm,
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to mat.er-La L things and their causes to physical antecedents.
The second reason for scientists' accepting and postulating de-
terminism was the necessity of making science justj.fy itself',
not by the truth it attained - for it cannot attain truth or cer-
tainty, but by its utility in predicting coming events, so that
man might know IIV\lhatis in the wind for t.hem" as James ~pressed
it. To fulfill such promises of utility in predicting coming
events, :!.ntheory at least, all the events of the universe must
f'o LLow the law of cause and effect, each cause a L way s producing
with fatal uniformity the same effect ..
The fact is, however, that science never does predict
anything with certainty. The variation sign is attached to every
f'ormu'La, and at best, an approximation is the best it can do, for
no stone ever falls quite as the "law" says it will and would if
events were constant and invariable. The variation from Newton's
Law of gravitation started Einstein on the study that resulted in
the discarding of gravitation and the substitution of curved space
1
:for it.
The ends that necessitated the postulates of determinism
have been given up, and hence the postulate, itself, is of no use.
Scientists have asserted that they used only efficient causes and
effects, but never recognised final ends, or purposes. Today, bi-
ologists, especially, fully recognise that organisms exist every-·
where, and each and everyone of them manifest intelligent parts
-------------_._---_. __--._--
1
Jeans
ENe .. BRIT. 11th Ed. New Vol. 32, tlRelati'?:1.:~.i!bySir J-ames
working together for their own good and the good of the whole.
Purposiveness appears visibly on every hand, and purpose always
exhibits a. certaih :freedom from efficient causes of mechanism,
and always exhibits the power to use mechanisms for purposes.
1)1]h11emechanisms exist ever-ywhe.re, mechanisms do not ccnt.r-o L pur-
posive organisms, but purposive organisms do use meo hs.nd sms - as
t.he dr:tver of the automobile guides it where he pleases. More-
over, human beings who can observe the behavior of intelligent
persons, and at th...esame time a1so observe their own internal
actions, declare that in any deliberate choice, they could have
made the opposite choice. This personal testimony of conscious
free-will, or conscious freedom, comes from a source from which
we secure incontestable judgments. Personal certitude transcends
any theoretical po stuLate assumed to meet the needs of a hypothe-
sis. Both subjective and objective arguments lead to the final
rej ection of scientific determinism which asserts that 9.11 events
are due to physical necessity, to causes that are antecedent to
the law of uniformity, which nowhere admits of any exception.
Purposiveness is free from efficient causation. TeleOlogy
has come into its own and scient:l.stsare compe11ed to recognize
it everywhere riding upon mechanisms. This new objective view,
supported by the old assurance that every man has, that at the
moment of making a deliberate decision, he could have made a dif-
See H.E.R.E. Ethics, II, p. 175 "Atheism?1l0harles B.
Upton, quoting Poynting from Hibbert Jou~nal-;-T.Juiy, 1903) p.939
and p. 743
1
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ferent one, is stated by J. H. Poynting, who says, "I hold that
we are more certain of our power of choice and of responsibility
than any ot.ner-fact, phys ical of psychical, II and III repudiate the
physical account of nature when it claims to be a full account,"
1
as LaPlace and other mechanists claimed it to be.
Before the self-conscious agent are forks in the road.
In many cases he can move either to the right or to the left. At
times the situation resembles that of a billiard ball balanced on
the edge of a razor. It can be moved either way by a force so
2
slight as to be irmneasurable. Myriads of such situations occur
in this world. A boat, moored on a level smooth lake, pointing
mid-way between two distant towns,(each equidistant, so that town
A, town B and the point of the boat form an equilateral triangle)
can go to either town with exactly the same theoretical expendi-
ture of energy. The boatman can turn the rudder either way with
tbe same bodily energy. The decision to go to A takes no more
physical energy than the decision to go to B - a total amount con-
sumed that no scientj.fic instrument pretends to detect. For a
mere thought cannot directly move any scientific instrument. A
man's spirit weighs nothing. Thinking, feeling and willing employ
1
See HeE.R.E. Ethics, II, p , 1'75, "Atheism,ll Charles B.
Upton, quoting Poynting from Hibbert Journal,(Ju1y 1903)P.939 & '743
2
See Wm. McDougall, II §ocialR~llOlogX, 11 (J •W .Luce, 4th Ed.
1911) for illustrations of billiard ball. H. Siclgvdck,"Methods of
Ethics"; Freewill; F.S.C .Schiller, 11 Humarri.sm"(1907) Essay -;"Freedom"
Wm. James, "Will to Believe,n(192l 'TI':d';)"jas .. Ward,nNatura11smand
!gnosticism,"(1899) all treat freedom of will and show the neces-
sity and reality of it.
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no physical energy that can be measurede Here is f'reedom f'rom
the physical. Here is liberty to use an energy - if it is an
energy - which transcends all the ability of instruments and
all sense to detect. Sir Oliver Lodge denies that mechanism only
exists, by decls.ring, 11 Life is not a form of energy, but guides
energy,11 so that from this view,.human will may be like the elec-
trical energy that opens a water gate to start a t.ur-bf.newheel -
one kind of energy releasing, di.recting or controlling another
kind. So our spirit.nnyreJBas~ the stored energy in brain-cells
1
which results in bodily behavit1r.
2
Another opponent of freedom is predestination. But,
strange as it may seem, predestinarians never have released man
f'rom moral obligations. They may declare in one breath that God
predetermines every thought, :fi'~eelingand act that a man may per-
form, and yet they declare that some of man's acts are sinf'ul,
and for such deeds God justly metes out punishment. Into the
devious ways of supralapsarianism and infralapsarianism this
study need not delve. Moreover, we may retain class-predestina-
tion according to +hat which God has aLready revealed,' the
end of men who join certain classes of"people. However, this
does not reject, but rather confirms f'reedom of'choice, ,justas
a conductor, proclaiming the destination of his train, does not
compel the boarding of'it, but merely points out the results of
1
See H.E.R.E. Vol. ii, p , 175, "Atheism'! Chas, B. Upton.
2
Wm. Kelly Wright, "A Student's Philosophy,"(MacMillan,
1929) Chap. 21, pp 391 ff gives an interesting an illuminating
discussion of predestination, showing clearly the dilemnas f'acing
proponents of tha.t theory.
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Predestination, seems, in theory at least, to affect the
non-moral as well as the moral. In either case, the theory of
God's :foreknowledge, irresistable grace, foreordination, and
assignment to bliss does not touch the problem of that freedom
which the moral man exercises. For as long as predestinar>iana
admit that a man is moral, their predestination does not deny
the moral freedom that is being studied here. It is in this
realm of :freedom from physical necessity,and in spiritual liberty
that man's moral t'r-e edom must be f'ound, He testifies,with all
the might and assurance of a conviction never yet molested by
any evidence, that he CAN choose, and does choose. He knows,
also, when in some instances he has no choice, and says so. By
this proclamation he takes responsibility upon himself 1"01" his
deeds.. He judges himself to be moral.
From this incursion into the problem of f'r'ee-willit is evi-
dent that a man is f'ree from physical compulsions, in certain of'his
deliberative, voluntary acts. The outside, material world, with its
mythical physical forces does not invade his sol.1~where his moral
decisions aa-e ma.de, His own body does not prevent him f'r-omaking
similar decisions and he can impart those decisions to his body as
a who~e, and to its members, so that they act in obedience to his e-
dicts. Nor does predestination, which at best, either completely
contradicts itself', and demeans the God whose sovere-ignity it seeks
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to magnify, by declaring, in the same breath, that man must do
what he does by the will of god, and so destroys this freedom~
If God toys with men like automatoms, and condemns them for what
He,Hirnself, does, He is made so abhorrent to all justice, that
no morality exists at aIle Fmnally, a conception of God's sover-
eignty, which views Him as the Creator of the World, in which He
reveals the consequences to any man, who joins himself to certain
classes of people may be readily admd, tted and accepted, for here
there is no in eli vidual determinism. A man is a free moral agent.
The forks of the road are clearly marked; he freely chooses the
way he will take and lmows the destiny that awaits him. God, who
foresees all, foressees what will happen to men who choose either
the right or the wrong road, but He does not compel any individual
to take either in place of the other.
Closely allied to the problem of man's ability to be a
free moral agent is that of the mental processes, intellect, e-
motion and will. All of these are engaged in any moral act. If
all of them, or :l.ndeedanyone of them, operates by necessi ty,
under some uniform law, defying any change, then there is a deter-
minism the.t prevents man from seeking and striving for a moral
ideal.
When we make a study of these mental processes we also
ask, incidentally, which one is the essential one in the moral
act. Thus a two-fold query arises. Is the will free to ma.ke de-
cisions - and does the ultimate issue of morality reside in the
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will and the will alone?
The old f'acuLty p sychoLogy viewed the soul as made up of
three distinct factors of intellect, emotion and will. This tri-
partite division made f'arnous by Kant (1'755) lasted until the days
of Wundt, (1879). It has a value for descriptive purposes. But
many complications arise when the three faculties are treated as
separate and distinct things. Only by such arbitrary methods, can
it be said where the intellect leaves off and the emotions come
in, and tihen, where the will functions.
James views it that the soul must be considered as an or-
1
ganic whole. The will is the whole man in action, the sum total
of what he thinks, feels and wills. Thus the old doctF-ine has
given away to the tmderstanding that intellectual, emotional and
volitional processes are so many phases of the organic whole~ in
action,:plhases which the person, himself knows and distinguishes.
This view of the three separate functionings of the spirit
has had fa.r-reaching consequences. It has always been clear to
moralists, when they considered the matter fully, tb8.t the intel-
lect operating as reason, must of necessity come into play in any
moral act worthy of the name. In a large sense, they saw that all
moral action, in general, is striving for an end. Such action is
rational. In it the intellect, as conception, or imagination,
must frame and conceive the end, and hold it in mind as an ideal.
1Wm. James, 11 Tho Will to Believe';(Green & co .1896) also
Henry Jones, "A FaithtTi'at EnquiresH (192:-::) p. 50
2
See Knudson, 11 Philosophy of Persona.lism'~ (1927 )Chap .1.
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All rationalistic methods of etbics, variously called goods or
hedonistic ethics, have freely emphasized man's rationality; and
have insisted that blind obedience without question of' the end
or the purpose of the act, could. not be moral.. The common 801-
diers, under orders of the general, have not been held responsible
for their military acts. Likewise, members of certain religious
orders, who have taken oaths of obedience, are not held account-
able, as though their acts were their own. The function of the
intellect in a moral act extends as far as the person is able to
foresee the consequences of his act, Without being able to fore-
see the immediate consequences, acts are no mor-e than blind obedi-
ence. The extent of' this foresight, variously estimated, and its
moral significance, have raised many nice questionse
How far must a man, ,to be morally responsible, be able to
fore-see? Should the rebel, who, to kill the dictator, blows up
the train on which he is riding, be held mor'ally responsible also
for the deaths of others on the train?' Is the bomb thrower guilty
of the murder and morally responsible" I'or the death of the inno-
cent by-standers who are killed, but at the same time unintended
victims. 'rhese are real questions, possLb Ly more often academic
than practical, but they serve to show where viewing the intel-
lect alone (as the essentlal process in a moral act) leads. The
final decision must be left to courts and. executioners who are
interested solely in ant:t-social and social conduct, rather than
by the personal, ethical teachings.
----------------------- _----
See Henry Sidgwic1t,"Methods of Ethics"(lst Ed.1874) also
"E~h!.c.~~.llJo:b..nDewey and Ja:mes-Tufts, (0.-; Belland Sons, 1t.1914)
Chap. XVI, 11 The Place of Reason in the Moral Life'''!Moral Knowledge'l
1
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From a positive vievvpoint, however, it is evident that
man possesses and uses some intellectual powers. He must enjoy
the perceptions or normal senses. He must have imagination - -
be able to form ideas of his perceptions. He must imagine or
fore-see the consequences of'his act to a normal d,:;,gree..For a
person is one who is normal and rational, free to make choices,
and his moral responsibility is the ability to determine choices
by the idea of the consequences of the issue - - the fore-sight
to see, to a normal degree, what those consequences will be. Be-
yond this, no one is held morally responsiblee This is to say
tha t man mus t have reason, judgment and understanding. For as he
judges, reasons and understands the issues presented to him and
acts upon them, so is he judged moral or i~noral.
This view is the every day accepted practise and common
concensus of opinion. Blind and dea.fmen are not held responsible
f'or those acts attributable to their misfortune, Errors in judg-
ment, illusions and delusions, often remove, or at least mitigate
moral responsibility. Forgetfulness, a defect of memory, is com-
mon, and from it flow many acts which are excused, but it is not
a settled question to what degree this is done in any instance.
Many a child and weak person a.re immorally punished for forget-
ting, f'ailures which the punisher freely excuses in himself. The
general opinion is clear and respected: man must be rational --
that is, have "normalll intellectual powers.
From Plato onward, thinkers, analyzing human conduct,
have agreed that men seek their own apparent good. That good has
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usually been defined in terms of some emotion, simple pleasure
or complex happiness, These have played a two-fold office in
moral acts. First, men, llke animals, do what gives them pleas-
ure easily and seek to continue the action as long as
the pleasure lasts, as in eating good meals. Such actions are
short-lived, for sensual pleasures soon lose their attraction,
and if continued, result in pain. Secondly, men act morally with
the aim to secure happiness, which is an idea in their minds, a
purpose, an end - one upon which hedonists have always built their
1
systeTI1S.
Many difficulties arise from this vievvpoint, which does
not, however, deny the fact that men have made emotions the can-
tral essential of their systems. The first difficulty arises
from the inability to define what happiness really is, how to gain
it, or how to keep it. It is as indeterminable as the silly pat-
ter of the comedians who first find that; some thing is "good" and
in the next breath, "bad'!
'l'heinability to show us how to secure happiness has led
some to vest morality in the emotional urges or motives of an act.
This leads at once to moral situations contradictory to C01TImOn-
~
sense. A bad act may have a good motive or vice versa. As Dr.
Sam Johnson observed, a man, exasperated at a beggar's importunity,
might throw a coin at the man's head with the intent of breaking
1
See ENG. BRIT.(llth Ed.Vol. VIII)H. Sidgwick,"Ethi~C?..s~.
573 f~.
Wm. G ..DeBurgh, "From Moralitx.~elig_i~on'; (London, Mc-
Millan and Evans, 1938) GIfford Lectures.
2
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it. But if'his aim was bad the beggar might tha.nkf'ullypick up
the coin and buy himself a meal, and, not knowing the motive of
the a.ct, would judge it to be a. fine thing. But if the intention
were known,a far differ'ent conclusion might be reached. These
faults, however, have not kept men from judging an act, done with-
out feeling, as empty and mechanical, devoid of worth.
Most ethical thinkers choose the will to be the single
and only essential of a moral act. Probab~y Kant was the ablest
I
defender of'this notion, although Archbishop Temple points out
that st. Augustine was the first to insist upon it, but with a
2
comprehensive view of the will.
The very question assumes the ancient fallacy that "will"
is a facult'y able to act alone, 11) a usage gaining some slight justi-
fication from long custom, as Sir Henry Jones points out:
"In every case of'knowing, all the powers of mind are em-
ployed. So far as I know there are now no surviving ex-
amples of psychologists who avow belief in the existence
and activity of separate faculties; but, on the other
hand, neither are there many psychologists that do not
make use of the concept of separate faculties. Occasion-
ally, the attempt is made to give priority to feeling,
or to the intellect, or to the will -- the will is prob-
ably the favorite of the moment. But, we may assume
that the self is one and whole in what it does. After
all, it is the personality A, B, or C who feels, knows,
or wills; and personality is not an entity hid:tng behind
the faculties and looking on as they work.lt3
-----------------~~.--
Kant, IlMetHphysics of Morals ';Sec. 1, p , 9.
2
,,~Wm. Temple, uQ£q, Nature"~Ma!!.LII(1934) Gifford Lect •
.)Henry Jones, n;A._J.?~~that Enguires,lIp• 50ff for full
discussicn·~
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to hUInan action than do ideas or feelings. Idea.s seem to be the
most remote from conduct; feelings nearer; and tre will seems to
make the final and complete gesture. Yet no one can say where
the one leaves off and the other begins. They are, in the final
analysis, the whole man in action. The essential of any moral
act does not reside in any single faculty of itself. In any
moral act the whole man is engaged.
Nor is there any evidence that,in any of these mental pro-
cesses, physical causes determine their functions. Even the
stoutest proponents of ma.terialism have been forced to admit tha.t
While physical events may follOW the law of efficient causation,
or uniformity under the same circumstances, our ideas, emotions
and volitions folloW another entirely different mental law of as-
sociation. One idea does not flow out of another as an effect 1
out of a cause. There is no absolute necessity of succession.
The will seems to stand in a somewhat different; relation
Each person can testify that often the reaction to any
situation varies, and nowhere do we find men all reacting in any
set pa.ttern. Situations present themselves and men do arouse dif-
ferent ideas in them. It is this liberty to form ideas that gives
the freedom that morality requires. Within that realm o.fliberty
man .forms idea.s which. for him, by choice, becomes idealS, and he
strives to realize the111~'Whenhis supreme ideal is Moral Perfection
----------------------------------------------------.------------------
rn
I.
1David Hume, "Treatise on Human Nature," (1739) On 9.ssoci-
Rtion against causation ;-Wm. jrone., "lti"-n£Ipie. of psycho_l,£&."
(1889) Chap- XIV. A~.()ciation, 9.full dJ.scusslon.
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he is a morally good man.
Man, to be free, must of necessity be free from the
laws of physical necessity, of the predestination of Divine
Will, and have freedom of menta.l processes. The person, an or-
gand,c whole, must be free to act as a whole in a certain way.
There has been no attempt made to free him fro:rnhis past, nor to
isolate him fron: the present. The freedom sought here has been
merely the absence of restre.ints that prevent a man's making con-
scious, deliberate choices, after weighing the consequences, and
using those means that lead to the end of moral perfection. Man
is free f r-om physical necessity, he is not dominated by any single
faculty of mind; he is an organic whole, acting as a unit; he pre-
determines his own end by the choices that he makes.
A moral man must be free, also, from non-rational instincts
of fear, anger, greed, etc., from appetites and from sentiments of
love and hate, so orten v Lewe d as obstacles to morality. They are
not, of necessity, hindrances, but, as many can testify, means to
moral freedom, becoming useful to moral development, as they were
1
to the Apostle Paul. The urges of hunger and other bodily appe-
tites need not enslave, but may become instruments for gaLn Lng
larger freedom, and are transformed into IIstepping stones of our
dead selves to higher things.1I
-_ ..,,-----------------
1
Arthur H. Holmes!, "T1!:eMind 2.f St. Paul,"O"lcMillan, 1929)
Chap. Phil. 4: 11,12. II lior. 12:7 - 10, Phil. 1: 15 - 24
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Not that he is free from every restraint, nor does he wish it,
fop absolute freedom from every earthly influence would mean
that he would become a dead man. He wishes to be free from non-
rational powers, so as to be at liberty to realize his chosen
1
ideal. For thaj;;,it is necessary to go beyond any abstraction
to the complete, organ'ic whole, the full man.
The freedom we are seeking to define is the liberty of
the whole person, a self-conscious, self-determining organism,
composed of body, mind and soul, whose end is his own moral per-
fection.. That this self-determining or-ganLsrn is freer than all
other organisms is at once apparent. Plants do indeed perform
certain selective operations, by which from the soil and the air,
they select certain elements and reject otbers. But they are
bound to do this, or die, for they have not the power to choose
other means for existence. Man, not only uses what nature offers
him, but constantly invents and discovers new means and new ways
to sustain life and prolong it.
In the same respect animals have a far greater freedom
of selection than plants. They choose their means of sustenance
and by their powers of locamotion, also vary their modes of strug-
gling for existence. Many of them migrate annually, especially,
the birds, and this is a. manifestation on a giga.ntic scale of tl:}e
locomotive liberty granted them. But here we find that they re-
spond to weather and climate, stimuli that are physical, and no
1
Gal. 5; 1,13; Phil. 3; 12 - 16
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doubt to others too obscure for observation. These acts re-
veal not a shred of purposive action. All of it is instinctive
and environmental. Both plants and animals, while they can
choose some of the means of their existence, cannot choose the
end. They must, within fairly fixed limits, devote themselves
to the reproduction of their kind. That "like begets like" is
1
indeed a far-reaching, if not absolutely fixed, law. There are
no observed reasons, or purposes, as ideas, residing within them.
Man, the monarch of the world, alone, can and does choose
for himself his ends and his means. The inooediate ends chosen
are myriad, but ultimately, in every normal "person" moral per-
fection rises above all others and all secondary ends become
means to its attainment. Man's ability, thus to hold before him-
self, the image of this supreme end, this morally complete man,
is evident in all thoughtful people. A series of questlons about
the utility of material things always brings a final conclusion
tha t in themselves, no matter how diligently they are sought f'or,
they give no satisfaction. They are always means to ends. The
ends, when found, turn out to be spiritual. Of' these, not t.he
intellectual riches, nor the emotional trea.sures such as happi-
ness, are themselves satisfactory. Unless a man knows himself' to
be earnestJ_y seeking to be a. better man mor81ly, his wealth and
-----_ ......-.. -.~----------
1
William McDougall, 1I0utlines of Social PsychologI," (6th
Ed.19l2) Cha.pter I, p , 29 rr , The volume treats fully anilll8.1 and
human. instinctlv~ and purpos~f""l D~hav1or.
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his erudition both appear to him to be empty and worthless.
Man t a natur-aL ideal is moral. To seek it, to realize it more
and more, he must be free from many things. But from the ideal
itself, as a beacon and an inspirer, he does not wish to be
free, but only to be at liberty to realize it more and more
within himself. This liberty is the moral freedom that we have
sought, and we have f'ound it in those men who are rational, who
seek ends, arid above all, in those who seek moral ends.
In reviewing the study of morality and freedom it is
evident the.t all conduct is not moral or irl1nloral.It may be so-
cial or anti-social, and as such,falls in the field of jurispru-
1
dence, and is of no moment in this study of personal morality.
The freedom of man has been lodged in the whole man, that
is, in his spirit's thinking, feeling and willing, and in judging
man's acts from the moral viewpoint, the ac t must be traced to
its source in the agent's emotions, his purposes and his decisions
of will. Tbese hidden springs of external action, in order to be
moral, must be free from external compulsion. Moral freedom.re-
sides, therefore, in tihe spirit of the man. To be a. person he
must be a moral agent, and to be a moral agent he must be free to
direct :nis thinking, feeling and willing to the extent of control-
ling them to a certain necessary degree.
Man does have this freedom and is a free moral being. As
such, he strives constantly to achieve his purpose -- the moral
1
A. Holmes, l1Principles of Character Making," (J.B. Lip-
pincott Co. 1913) Chap. XI, On social conduct VB. morality.
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p er-f'ec t Lon of'his be f.ng ,
Unf'ortunately, man f'Lnde that that which he finds him-
self to be striving to become, and to realize the end established,
tha t of mora.l pel~fection, meets with violent oPposition from the
concepts held by the society in which he must live. He is faced
with a conflict to which he must be reconciled, before he can
realize that which is at the very core of his being. The basis
of' that conflict -- when man is placed in society -- and its is-
sues, are the next matter of consideration to be treated in the
succeeding chapter.
THE INDIVIDUAL AND TI-lE KINGDOM OF GOD
CHP.PTER IV
Man In Society
In t:b..e preceding cha.pters the ind.ividual person has
been stud.ied. It has been shown t.ba t , as a person, he is a nor-
mal, rational, moral being, able to imagine tbat ideal of'him-
self that he wishes or longs to be, with an urge to
re;::tl:izethat ideal, and with power, free f'r-om physical control,
to strive at least f'or its progressive realization in himself ..
In following this procedure the individual was abstracted
from the world in which he lives. Such abstraction is of value
for purposes of description, but as this chapter develops it
will be appa.r!\mtthat such procedure can be and is highlJr dan-
gerous; because the abstra.ction TIlayeventually be viewed as the
organic whole, and with devastating and f'allacious results. It
is now necessary to study the individual as a constituent "whole'!
a member of society, a position that every man enjoys from his
birth to his death.
But here a conflict arises. The smallest child is
irked by the restraints of the home, feels this growing con-
flict and grows sharply coriacLoua of'it when he sta.rts to school,
meets "that tyrant," the teacber, who hampers restrains and sup-
presses his natura.l inclinations. With each successive period
of growth the conflict expands in its manifestations, and de-
mands new a.djustments. This warfare with society is the univer-
s8.1 experience of all men. True, it may be felt more keenly by
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some than others, depending, as it does, upon temperment; but ;t;
the conflict is always there, not to be ignored, but to be met
and dealt with ..
Man looks within himself and finds that there, he is in-
deed , U monarch of all he surveys. Il He finds that he thinks,
feels and wills; that he does establish ideals and can work
toward them .. He finds himself, at once created and creator.
Man also looks upon the external actions of men and sees an en-
tirely different picture. Man becomes nothing but a c.r-ea tiur-e
of the society or world in which he lives. To observing men
it is from these divergent viewpoints that the conflict appears
between the individual and society_ An understanding of what
man is, as viewed from that external viewpoint, is necessary
bef'ore any attempt can be made to reconcile that conf'lict, to
delineate the society in whicb it would not exist at all.
Generally, the first question arising is: 1J\1hatis a
society? Some thinkers conceive it in tel!.'l:l1Sthat carry the
conflict, between the individual person and society, so far as
to deny the reality of'the person entirely.
About this theory of'society Dr. Daniel S. Robinson has
this to say:
!lIn the social philosophy of the social theologians
society is an over-individual, super-intelligence.
They refer to it as the social consciousness,.which,
in the very essence of'nature, has culminated in a
social order, conscious of its substantial Qnity and
inherent soladarity. The individual mind has always
been a mere abstraction. The real mind is tha.t of
the social whole, and it is in the making ••••The
5'7
mind of the society transcends the minds of its mem-
bers. The monster engulfing mind is that real master
mind ......Subtract from the universe the human social
consciousness, and the life blood of the individual
minds is drawn. Society lives. Yes, but it also
thinks and feels and vvills. It is an organism. Yes,
but it is more than that - it is a super-intelligent
mind.
~----They hold that it is philosophically sound to
look upon a nation, an educational institution, a busi-
ness corporation or any other social institution, as
having a peotl,liarmind of its own,not only over and
above the minds of its several members, but constituted
by their interpenetrations.n
"For them the human social-consc:i.nusness is the only
ultimate and absolute- reality. It is the human social
consciousness which has made us and not we ourselves.
Indeed, not only did it make us but it made nature.
For how else is the following statement of Professor
Edward Scribner Ames - one of the ablest of the social
theologians,- to be interpreted? 'Another misapprehen-
sion and reference to the social appears in the concep-
tion of its relation to the cosmos 0:)." nature. Dwr'keim
and Cornford.have shown tha t the cosmos is socially de-
t.ermt.ned •.••• The picture of a Dei ty fashionlng the
world and all that in them is, is so vivid that few
realize that it has little, if any~ £lace in a genu-
inely scientific view of the world.' The hQman s06ial
consciousness, child of the cosmic evolution as it ad-
mittedly is, nevertheless determines the earth and the
starry firmanent on high, the whole cosmos •••• The so-
cial consciousness is not only a living organism and
a super-intelligent mind, it is God, and the only God,
a very God of God." 2
This picture gives us no such thing as a real person.
The social consciousness 1s at once the. earth, the heavens, an
organism, a super-intelligence, an all in all,"God, a very
God of God." Man exists because society exists and makes
1Fro:m Journal of Heligion, Vol. I, p , 268
2
Dr. Daniel Robinson, 1! The God of the Liberal Christian'
(D. Appleton Co. 1926) pp 69-71, also see Knucfson,----11 The Phii-=--
os.<?,p~f Persoml.lisml.llp. 100 .ff for a treatment of this theory>.
58
1
him. He is t.r-ane Lerrt, unr-ea.L;passes a-1J'myas do the heavens
and the earth, and only socIety, the Eternal remains ..
Man is made :merely to serve the ends of society. In
himself' he has no value, and is reduced to a mere instrument,
to be cast off, when of no further use, just as an old pair of
shoes are t::1rownaway and a new pair takes their place. This
concept has grovm and developed along with that of some politi-
cal economists who hold the state to be the supr-eme and abso-
lute over-lord of its citizens' activities ..
liThe individual is subordinated to the state, t'hrou.gh
which he alone can be developed in his na tur-e and comj-
pleted, and to which all of his ef'forts must be directed.
'I'bestate, therefore, exercises a controlling and regu-
lating authority over every sphere of life, in order to
bring the individual into harmony of the good of the
whole ..11 2
That this doctrine has been the basis of long and oft
time bitter struggle is a matter of com.mon historical knowledge.
Its modern development, giving rise to the concept of social
consciousness and the limitation of the concept of society to
the state alone, has given us modern totalitarianism. The two
ideas, one asserting that the individual being is supreme, and
the other declaring that society is supreme, are locked in a
death struggle, the outcome of which cannot be predicted, nor
does the result make a basic difference in the conclusions of'
this thesis.
1
xxv,
Ene • Brit. 11th ed ,"SOCiOloq'! by Benj anrl.n Kidd, Vol.
for a similar view of the indivi ual.
2
Enc , Brit. 9th ed."Pol.itic_alEc(:momy'!J .I. Ingram,p. 349
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The sociologist, Professor Benjamin Kidd, justifies
this struggle, and sees in it the culmination of the inevia-
table victory of that "most advanced science of all;' sociology.
This direc ting force is der Lved from the teachings of Hume and
Huxley, t.hr ough Kant and Hegel, a.Lao Grotius and Savingy and
others, down through the English utilitarianism of'Herbert
Spencer, influenced on the one hand by the English concept, of
the rights and liberties of the individual, and on the other by
the Marxian theory and its Latin concept of the supremecy of
the state. Professor Kidd can see but one development and that
is the "theory of organic evolution by natural selection and
the bistorical rnethod as an ever expanding influence in the
1
science of society."
Not on Ly is the societ·y making the individual; it is
doing so in keeping with "the highest spiritual ideal of man,
and the only conception of the Truth or the Absolute which the
hursan mind can hold at the present time, is that which is being
evolved in it in relation to its ovm. environment, w:hich is the
2
social process.1!
From the above discussion it is evident that some soci-
ologists view man, as James says~ as a box-within-a-box-within-
a-box. ad lnf'initum. One by one remove the Lar-ger- ones and a.t
last a vacuum is reached and the individual is gone. Man is
just layer after layer of social increments. Are these conclu-
- -- - ..--.----------------------~~
1
Enc.Brit. 11th Ed. New Vol. 25, ".S2e:i_olo~x'!Benjamin
Kldd, pp 330, 331
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They contradlct, not only the inner reality of each
person's own thinking, feeling and willing, but it is obvious
that society does treat individuals. It makes and imposes upon
them these social increments. By the same figure used to de-
stroy the individual may the society be destroyed. Remove per-
sons, one by. orie, until the last .Ls gone, and society vanishes
also into a vacuum. It must be recognized that to abstract the
individual from the society is fatal, just as it is an absurd-
ity to abstract society and elevate it to a "God of Gods." The
two are not separate but components of the whole. Mal'l-is at
once an individual and a part of society. SOCiety is at once
an entity and a part of man. Divorce the two and both vanish
into thin air_ They can be separated only for purposes of de-
scription. Who can say where the man leaves off and the soci-
ety begins, or v ice versa?
The theory of social consciousness being supreme arises
from the old one of evolution, which was purely mechanical.
After it was derived, 10 and behold, it makes men. These men
evidently treat evolution loos~ly. Does the Social Conscious-
ness, who is God of Gods and creates the world, make it and so-
cieties out of Nothing? Does he create at all? If so, then
this is not evolution in its ordinary sense where t~ere 1s no
creation, but just mere "accidental growths"
The theory h8.8 no value either of a prac tical or theo-
1
retical nature. Professor Ames makes it into a religion, and
1J. S. Robinson, "The God of the Liberal Christian;' p.79
t
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it is evident that it is designed to eliminate both what was
call ed "supernatural'! and "crea t.Lon'' too; likewise the God of
orthodox people. How utterly impossible it is for men to even
think, ill terms apart :from God, is evident when, after all is
said, the proponents of the Social Consciousness come back to
the IIGodl1 they have made. This "Godl! has creative powers.
Hence he is a person. So in the final analysis man comes back
to persons. In reality, the only change made is thst a new
label has been placed over the old and a jubilant declaration
made that the old content ha.s been swept away forever and that
there is something new in the world.
What has been done is the abstraction of the idea.from
the thing, society; then this idea has been hypostatized, given
a being of its own, even to the erection o:fit into a Deity.
That moral relationships are to be erected and guided
brings persons back again into the picture. Morality is person-
al and "we may be sure that no scheme of measurement will ever
be devised which will strike a balance of quantum of satisfac-
1
tion and number of desires for an entire social order."
The ~inal consideration o~ the fallacy of this viewpoint
is that it is pr-edLcn tiedupon a scientific theory that has fa.l-
len flat. Mechanical Evo.lution is impossible and it destroyed
------_ .._--_-----
D. s. Robinson, "The God of the Liberal Christian," p ,
94, see also pp 80 ff for a. full discussion of this concept.
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Mechanisms The transformation: of evolution from performation-
ism and from mechanistic descriptions of development, over to
creative evolution, by Henri Bergson, in 1911, and by Conway
Lloyd Morgan, in 1922, render much of the ancient; and modern
speculations in sociology, inapplicable. The problem, however,
remalns acute as ever~
In his book, "The Philosophy of Personalism," Dr ..
Knudson points out that lithe fallacy of abstp8.ction is one of
the commone sb of errors. The essence of this fallacy consists
in overlooking the truth of metaphysical individualism, and in
mistaking class terms for things, or the classifying processes
2
of our thought ror the process of reality."
1Nhen we see a group of chairs, everyone of them differ-
ent, yet recognizable as such, and we clap the name nchalr" up-
on each, we have done nothing to the chs.Lr-s themselves. "They,"
as Dr. Knudson points out, "remain as separate and individual
3
as ever.lI The abstraction chair has no existence by itself; it
is only when the a.bstraction, or idea takes form, that we have
a chair, and then each is individual, never any two being just
exactly alike.
See ENC. BRIT. 11th Ed. New Vol. 32,"Relativit:;y_:"by
Sir James Jeans.
2
1
Knudson! II The Philosophy of Personalism, II p , 187 ff
:3
Ibid ..
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Such attempts at abstraction always result in struc-
tural definitions, and never deal with a.ctual eXisting things.
This is one of' the great factors of'the conflict between the
individual and society.. For ana.lysis reveals that in such, a
definition combines two very distinct and different components,
each of which has its own being. 'I'hemembers of a human soeL»
ety are parsons. Their relations are spiritual, invisible
bonds that unite them. It is possible, therefore, to make as-
sertions about the member that cannot be made about the whole
SOCiety. Turning from abstraction, to an analysis of'persons,
associated together, for a definition of society, a start may
be rnade with the usual and common statement, "a collective body
of'persons 'comprising a community, II or "the aggregation of' such
1
communi ties," neither of which gives much insight into the
nature of a society.
In a loose sense this terminology might be applied to a
chance group of persons gathered together in a city park on a
hot summe r- day, brought there by a desire to escape the aummer-
heat. 1" ./1No one, however, would claim such a group to be a SOCiety.
The group might grow into 11 a ma ss" or an n assembly'! a "congrega-
tion'! a "mu'L titude, II and yet be nothing more than loosely knLt
groups with no common end or purpose of a spiritual nature. The
'/ reason of: bhe ga ther1ng Ls absent.,r But on the other hand ther-e
might be an invisible bond tha t brings them together ,_ an unseen
1
Webster's International Dictionary.
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force, not apparent to the eye, one of which the onlooker would
have to be appraised to know that it existed. Persons are the
steady, unchanging factor in the group, crowd 01" assomb'Ly, The
ties may change from the natural, gregarious instincts - as,
for instance, the innate desire that brings people to the scene
of a construction project, their running to see a dog fight, or
a fire, gathered together waiting for a street car, 01" viewing
the base-ball score board. Thus it is that both persons and
their "ends" have a vital part to play. To finish the diction-
ary definition - I1bound together by some ties" - is specious,
and gives but little more than the obvious information, yet out
of it has grown the concept that underlies the basic conflict of
the Lnd.LvLdua L and "society.n
From the days of hand--work to that of mass production
there have been many and far reaching changes that have taken
place. The old guilds of England were societies, it is true -
men were bound together by ends thnt were spiritual - but the
replacing of them by the vast organizations of mass production
changed the entire picture. The old ideals of artisanship gave
way to quantit'y production, and the making of profits for the
stock holders. Contrary to all ordinary assump tLons, such ag-
gregates of workers did not, in their work, form societies in
the true sense of the word. There were groups, crowds - but not
societies held together by their ambition to contribute a part
in the production of spiritual values.
Functionally, society may be defined as a group composed
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of t'J'lOor more persons, made up in any way, who, by their joint
efforts, create a product that they carmot produce separately
and then add together. This necessitates that the end of soci-
ety be spiritual and not material, for obviously, material
things may be made separately and then be brought together.
Factories often make parts in one place and ship them to another
f01'"assemb'Ly, This is not true of choirs, orchestras, schools,
the home and many other types of activities.. 'I'heend demands
unified action and is mutual. The person wishes to sing and
joins the choir, a society, whose end it is to furnish him with
an opportunity to sing. This is the essential characteristic of
any society in the true sense of that word.
This brings another conclusion to the fore-ground, name-
ly, that a society is ma.de up of persons who ha.ve freely chosen
to enter it. Entrance is made to achieve the fulfillment of a
desired end. Just as choirs are made by persons wishing to sing
so are all other societies made. Compulsi6n or chanc e does not
produce a society.
It is evident, however, that individuals, without their
consent, are born into 9. home, a state; are compelled, by law,
to attend school, enter the army, etc. Here, the real cause of
conflict appears, that of hybrid-societies. The home, the state,
public schools with forced a.ttendance, the army, factories -
none of thesf'l,in every instance, 9.re true societies.
The home without children is 9.society composed of bus-
band and wife banded together in a COIDYr.onpurpose, freely, and
with B. spLr-Lt.ua.L end. A child is born, and a hybrid-society
is born with it. A third manber, without its own consent, has
teken its place. This is but a means to an end. It must be re-
member-ed, however, that the ch.LLd is not a person. 1Ji:11.enit has
reached the age of moral responsibility, has grown into a person,
this con:flict mayor may not disappear. The child may become an
integral part of the home, 01" it may rebel and leave it. If it
remains and assumes its place as a member of the home, the end
of the child has been fuli'illed and the home is no longer a hy-
brid but a true society.
The schoo L is always partly hybrid; thez-e are always
those who rebel at attending; some accept the opportUnity and
for that portion it is a means to an end. Likewise, the army
and the state are partly hybrid and partly true societies. Where
they leave off being mere organizations and become societies is
ino_8finable and thus a cons tan t source of conflict.
Factories, with their mass production, their assembly
lines, their forced labor as automatons, can be either organiza-
tions or societies. The end defined determines their classifi-
cation. As mere or-garidzations, interested only in getting the
most labor' for the least pay, they become focal points for vio-
lent conflict. When the workers band together this sometimes
makes societies. At best, however, they have, with few excep-
tions, remained hybrid, and conducive to continual disturbance.
Another consideration presents itself. That is, that
the end of the society and the persons making it up must be
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identical. The singer' wishes to join a choir that; he might
sing in it; the choir's end is to provide a means to fulfill
that end; and the fimll and most far reach:tng conclusion pre-
sents itself, namely - that the persons making the society are
at once ends and means, and the society is likewise an end and
a means. Ask that father about the home and he will deoLa.r-e
that it is a means to his end. Ask the wife - and the fatl")er
is a means. Ask the child who is a means to both father and
mother and, immediately, they both are means to it.
Drawing together the elernent:;sdiscussed it is clear that a
society is composed of two or more persons, drawn together in
any way, working to produce something that they cannot produce
eepa r-a be'Ly and then add together.. The end of the society is
always spiritual and identical to the end of the persons com-
prising it; thus both persons and society are means and ends at
one and the same time.
Several conchlsions force themselves forward for consid-
eration. Man and society are not two separate entities, but are
rather component parts, ins eparable except for the pur-poses of
description.. Man makes the society but it irrnnediatelybecomes
an integral part of his being. Society wields a vast influence
over the individual but is a part of the persoD, and falls, with-
out him, into nothingness,
In reality, the State and like organizations of mixed
purposes, have been called, erroneously, societies, for in the
strict sense they are not societies, but hybrids, and it is here
that the conflict arises with the individual. The conflict is
68
not between the society and the individual, but with the hy-
brid or-ganLzatj.ons he has built. Tha t this is so is of no con-
sequence to this thesis, for the problem lies between Persons,
whose end of moral perfection gives them a unique and special
consideration, and tru~ soc:l.eties..The moral man does have a
society whereby he reconciles this conflict, in whd.o h there is
no conflict between himself and the society and which elimi-
nates also the conflict between the person and the hybrid. so-
cieties in which he finds himself surrounded. This society
is the Kingdom of God, and it is in it ths t w e find the recon-
ciliation of the conflict that has been in evidence throughout
this essay.
THE INDIVIDUAL AND 'I'l1E KINGDOM 0 F GOD
CHAP'I'ER V
The Kingdom of God
As a self-conscious, self-directi.ng organism, by the
processes of his thinking, feeling and willing, man has come,
in the final analysis, to choose the end of moral pepfection
as his goal in life. To do this he is free from physical nec-
essity. In spite of the obstacles presented by the world in
which he lives, and contrary to arguments that declare him un-
able to do so, man evidently does so choose, and has made pro-
gress toward the realization of the moral ends. He has been
able to personally exercise liberty, and more, he has also
formed societies that serve to that end.
He has established homes, entered into fraternal orders,
choirs, or-cnee t.r-as, welfare societies, and a whole host of other
societies wherein there is no necessary and Lnher-eribconflict
between the individual and the society of which he is a part. In
acme cases the society and the person are at once both ends and
means, coterminus and mutually dependent one upon the other. On
the other hand, however, it is evident on all sides that men
also form hybrid-societies, with mixed functions. In these he
has not been able to resolve the innep conflicts.
That man hs.s felt tbis conflict and recognized what, of
necessity, the society must be, to remove that conflict, is
clearly written upon the pages of history of all ages. In pro-
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test, men have formed monasteries, orders of monks and nuns,
and have founded other settlements, as Robert Owen did in his
New Harmony, or witness many of the Quaker, Mennonite, Amish
and other similar ventures, which have always been defeated in
their purpose, by the bringing in of elements that make of them
other hybrid-societies within hybrid society, so that the con-
f'lict has not been reconciled or removed, but intensified. Be-
sides these attempts thinkers have imagined ideal states, like
Pla to' s IIHepublic'! In such ideal states the conflict between
the individual and the soc:tety is reconciled, so that the hy-
br-Ld is made into a real society. The most famous and v"e1l
worked out of'these plans for such an ideal society is that of'
InrrnanuelKant in hi s IIKingdom of Ends."
Kant saw and pointed out the danger and fal19_cy of ab-
straction.. He insisted upon there being a consideration of
both subjective and objective data. Man is free from physical
necessity and therefore has f'reedom of will, which makes of him
a moral being. He conceived the person as being a rational be-
ing and only such were persons. Man was, therefore, lIan end in
himself, not merely means to be a.r-bltrarily used by this or that
will, but in all his actions------must at the same time be always
1
regarded at the same time as an end." He continues:
------_.__ ...-
1
Kant's "Theory of Ethics," tr ..VIT.K" Abbott(Longmans,
Green 8t Co .1909) p. -46. See pp 23 ff for full development of
grounds from which these conclusions are drawn. ENC. BHIT. 11th
Ed. New Vol. 15, Kant, R. Adamson gives full treatment of Kant's
philosophy and cornplete bibliography. See also pp 65 of above
tr.( W.IC. Abbott's - Kant's "Theory of Ethics" )for Concept of Free-
dom.
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"Beings, whose existence depends, not on our will but
nature's, have nevertheless, if' they are pat10na1 beings,
only a r,slative vaLue as means, and therefore are called
things, ration~l.beings, on the c?ntrary, are called _2~£'-
sons because tne~r very nature po~nts them out as en<fts
"I"il'"themselves,that is something that must not be used
as means and SO f'ar, ther8f'ore, res:trlcts f'reedom of'ac-
tion and is an object of respect."
Man is an organism made up of component parts that are
all different but yet are all working for the good of each other
and the good of'the whole, so that ea.o h and every constituent is
at once a means and an end.
I
I
!
I
r
(
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"Rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man nec es-
sarIly conceives his ovm existence as being so: so f'ar
this is a subjective principle of hmnan action. But
every other' rational being regards its existence simil-
larily, just as the same rational principle holds f'or
me; so that it is at the same time an objective princi-
ple f'rom which a supreme practical law, all laws of the
will must be capable of being deduced.1I 2
This principle will be the gul.dLng law of'all conduct
and resolves itself' into the Ca.tegorical Imperative; lISo act as
to treat humanity, whether in thine own per'son, or in that of'any
3
other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means on1y.11
Man, as is evident f'rom this principle and as Kant t.auglrt ,
is at once a lawgiver, an objective act, but at the same time he
is a keeper o~ that law and, therefore, it is at once a subjective
act.. As he will give· laws only arter considering the other ra-
----------
IKant's I!Theory of Ethics," tr. W.K. Abbott (Longmans,
Green & Co.1909) j;)-;4-6, pp.23-ff
2
Ibid$ p~. 46, 4'7
3
Ibid
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tional beings around him, there will be only universal laws,
built not upon caprice or chance, but upon rationality, Neither
will he change those Laws without cause, and thus he becomes in
harmony with the universal laws of nature and there emerges the
universal law. This implies a state of relationships that con-
stltute a society. This society Kant called the !1 Kingdom of Enm'!
This "Kingdom ofnEndsl! was that society where each man
regarded himself as a means and an end. All other members who
have freely chosen this rela.tionship, constitute a society that
is at once both means and an end. They are coterminus and there
is no conflict. The individual, as a lawgiver, is sovel'"'eign,
as a member of' the society, a subject. All being rational men,
with the same objective, they all give and make the same laws
and become co-sovereigns and co-subjects. The operation of this
Kingdom rests upon "Dignity" or self-respect:
"The practical necessity of acting upon this principle
does not rest at all on feelings, impulses 01'1 inclina-
tions, but solely on the relation of rational beings,
to one another, a relation in which the will of the ra-
tional being must always be regarded as legislative,
since otherwise it could not be conceived as an end in
itself. Reason then refers every maxim af the will,
regarding it as legislating universally, to every other
will and also to every other action towards oneself,
and this not on account of any other practical motive,
or any future adva.ntage, but fro:m the idea of the dig-
nity of' a l"ational bein~, obeying no law but that which
nehimself also gives."_l
--~--.- •• -" > -- ... ~ ._--_ •• _._ ---_._ •• _
1
Kant's "Theory of Ethics," tr. W.K. Abbott, p.52-55.
See also pp 51 ff for elaboration of the concept of the nKing-
dom of \I·Ends.II
Everything in the "Kingdom of Ends" has eLbher value
or Dignity_ Those means that help to the achievement of the end
have value, but they can be replaced by equivalents; some will
be one thing to one and another to ano bher-; Mens' ta_stes and
temperments vary. The final end has no equivalent, cannot be
replaced by another, so has dignity. Thus moral perfection is
an ultimate, belongs to all, and thus gives and has Dignit:iJ.
Everything has either value or Dignity. "Wha.tever has value
can be replaced by something else which is equivalent; what -
ever ---- is above all valUe and therefore a&nits of no equiva-
1
len-t, has Dignity."
The connection is clear. If a man must always treat
another as himself - as the Golden Rule more clearly states -
then since he treats himself as ru1 end, and never sacrifices
himself to any thing as a mea.ns, justice in society compels
each member of that society to treat every other member just
like himself. To this end in himself society functions. In this
society no member 01" group of members, no matter how rich or
powerful, would ever treat another member as a means to some end,
in which the member would be injured or even ignored. In such a
society there would be no slaves, no people like those descx'ibed
by Aristotle, mentioned above, but all would be fellows, equa.l
brothers. Stripped of all accidental attributes, each man would
---.---- -_-- ------ --- --~ ---~._--_-_ -- ~------- ----- ------
1Kants "Theo+of Ethics,1l tr. W.K. Abbott, p. 52-53. See
also pp 51 55 for elaooration of th e concept of the i'Kingdom of
Ends."
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be exactly alike, equal to one another, having the same rights
and duties.. TJIorally,in such a society, there would be the
same unity we find in one person.. He would be seeking his own
moral perf'ection according to the categoric~\l 1mpera tive or the
Golden Rule, and never injure himself. The fact that such units
are multiplied would in no wise change the ideal to be sought.
The next; trait of the principle is its universality. A
man who performs an act under certain cond:ttions should never
change his conduct without a. change in circumstances; for a
reasonable man is not capricious - he does not change without a
sufficient reason for changing. In this respect the princ1.ple
resembles a natural law which asserts that there is a. uniform-
:tty in nature, ths.t the same cause always produces the same ef-
fect, and that changes never come in the world without a cause
I
I
r
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for them. Thus does the rational man act with reason, and thus
does he follow the very nature of the world in which he lives.
Such allKi,ngdomof Endsl1 is supposedly composed of perfect-
ly rational or moral men. They are always just. They never act
capriciously, never change without reason and never relinquish
their supreme purpose, of retaining their own moral perfection.
f
In such a kingdom there 1s no external force, for none is neces-
sary. Each man obeys the law because he makes it, because he
himself acknowledges that it is good for him, is what he wants
above everything else. No man leaves that society, for he retains
that supreme desire to remain perfec,t in all his dealings, and
he finds in that society,of his fellows, congenial compa.ny. Out
of self-respect and out of respect for the other member's, who
I'
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are the same as himself, he gLa.d'Ly obeys the moral law and all
the subsidiary laws, or rules of conduct that flow logically out
of it.
This lIKingdom of Ends" would, naturally and necessarily
arise from men who have already adopted, as the supreme purpose
of' their lives, their own moral perfection, and who behold in
this Kingdom of Fellowship, lj_ke~minded souls. Their gregarious
instinct:,. unimpaired by their moral perfection, still functions,
and they gladly enter into a fellowship where they are recognized
and in which they are received as members, where the activities
are always influenced by a single desire and into vmich they can
freely enter without fear of conflict.
'I'he c1'iticisms that are brought against this "Kingdom'! on
the grounds that it is impractical, miss the mark, and do not
lessen the value of this conception. For the "Kingdom" is an
Ideal. It is a conception, but one derived logically and neces-
I
I
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sarily from the nature of persons who must seek to be rational,
who behave the same under the same ctrcnms tanoes , without chang-
ing, unless for a sufficient reason. Such people are perfect
beings and of' course such perfection does not exist. But this
Ideal of Perfection is, nevertheless, a most valuable and prac-
tical one.
First, it is derived rightly, namely, it is but the
ca.rrying out, in the imagination, under the strict control of
reason, what men imperfectly behold, in their strivings for a
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perfect society. Next, coming thus out of hrunan experience,
but transcending it, the Ideal furnishes a beacon or guide to
moral men who try to reform societies, or to form them. It is
indeed the final ultimate standard by which every eaJ?thly human
organization must be judged by rational,moral beings. Finally,
it is practical, because men are always changing their societies
and this Ideal shows them how they may take the next step for-
ward.
No one can at once, and completely, set up this I!King-
dom.1! It takes time even to inform people about it, and more
time to develop them into characters that make it remotely pos-
sible. It is evident how far away it is when a search is made
for even one state government that is founded on the single su-
preme purpose of making its citizens morally perfect, and with
all its laws derived from and in harmony with this supreme end.
Even in Democracies where the closest approach is made,
there is a. yawning cbasm between this ideal society and the ac-
tu,al hybrid-societies that they represent. But in Democracy it
is possible to see that the ideal has been working in mens' minds,
and, even if but dimly felt, they are groping their way in the
darkness toward it, led by their ovm reason and their desire for
a society with a moral or spiritual end.
Turning from Kant's lIKingdom of Ends" to the Kingdom of'
God, as depicted by Jesus, there are, obviously, many points of
similarity, which is not surprising, as Kant c~me from a devout
7'7
Pietistic family. The first point of similal"'ity is the_tboth
were Ideals.. It is well to observe, at this point, the differ-
ent concepts of ideals; the one, that which regards an ideal as
visionary and wishful thinking, and that in which an ideal is
1
thought of as a perfect standard of conduct, the only real thing
upon the earth.. An ideal as the Perfect cannot be defined for no
one knows what the Perfee t is and ~herefor earmo t define it, yet
at the same time it is the only and the most real thing on earth.
The manufacturer of an autornobile produces a new model and im-
mediately sets out to make a more nearly perfect one. What the
perfect is he can never say; he goes a step at a time, always
making progress, always improving, but the the ideal, the per-
fect car has never arrived. Just what it would be cannot be
conceived. Men write books, build beautiful buildings, and when
they are finished, regardless of how fine they may be, flaws are
apparent, the changes that would have improved them are evident.,
New ones are made and immediately and again the ideal is e. step
away. Just like 11 Jacob's Ladder" the ideal reveals itself step
by step, but the end is infinity. Yet it is this burning desire,
for the perfect, the resolve to attain the perfection imagined,
that has furnished all advance that has come into the world.
Kant was showing man that he was not a crea.ture of physi-
)cal necessity, that he was not tl~ mere automaton, created by a
God who had roreordained and predestined every act, every desire,
every thought. Rather, to combat to combat such specula.t~ve
JL
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theologies, he pointed out to man that within himself he found
freedom of will, that he was not a creature of chance, but a
person, rational, with the inte~ligence to view choices pre-
sented to him, and to act upon them as he chose in the light of
his own concept of moral perfection. Further, he showed, of
necessity, what kind of a society that would be in which all
these conflicts would be reconciled and wiped away.
It was upon the very same basis that man found, within
himself, by those concepts that well up within the human heart,
and persist and operate, despite all contradiction of abstract
speculations, that Jesus Christ gave to Man the Kingdom of God.
Jesus regarded man as the supreme end of'the universe.
He arose above every s~iety or man, every state, for indeed
was not the Sabbath made for man and not man for the Sabba th?
Moreover, he recognised that man was a moral being whose end
was his own moral perfection, and he defined that perfection
/
J
for him as l1be ye perfect even as the Father in Heaven is per":'
1
fect .." This Ilnorm of perfectionl1 is the norm of the Kingdom
of Heaven; i tildevelopsll fl'omwithin outwards, as a good tree
brings forth fruit. (Matthew 7: 17)
The Kingdom of God is an ideal society composed of men
who have freely chosen the ideal of perfection as their goal of
lire:
------------.- --- ------------------------- .----------------
.Hastings Dictional":!of the Bible (Charles Scribners,
1906) Article - Kingdom of God - J. Orr, p. 852. For full dis-
cussion of the Kingdom of God and bibliography see pp 844 - 856.
1
----~--~ ..---------
"It is in its principle something inward, vital, in-
visible. (Luke 17: 20, 21) It is not the idea of Jesus,
however, that this Kingdom should be confined solely
to this inward life. It is r-at he r- a principle wor-k+ng
from within outwards for the renewal and transforma.:..
tion of every department of our earthly existence, mar-
riage, the family, the state, social life~ etc. (Matthew
19: 3 - 9; John 2: 1 - 11; Matthew 22: 21)1
"_~_ ..__lt is a moral task set before the members for
their achievement."2
The ideal of the Kingdom is at work and is both an actu-
ality and a future thing; actual, in that men have entered it,
and are on the way to achievement of its goal; in the future),in
tbat it has yet to be realized in its entirety. That it is of
supr-eme worth to man is shown by the pa r-a bl.eof The Pearl of
Great Price Luke LJ: 18), this worth residing in the fact that
it gives to man a conc ep t that removes all conflict. Man and his
society are at peace. They 8re at once both means and ends. His
end is the moral perfection which is also to be the end of'all in
societYe
Jesus deflned man and ea t.Lma ted his value by his end.
Free man is not a creature of chance or caprice. He nknows the
3
truth" and Jesus said" I am the truth,"
4
make you free,n
and "the truth shall
5
and nhe that comes is in no way to be cast oub'l
.. _.----_._._--- -- ----- __ .._--
H:istings'Dictionary of the Bible (Charles Scribners,
1906) Article, Kingdom of God, J. Orr, p.852. For full discussion
of' the Kingdon1 of'-Go(f-anCi:-bibliographysee pp 844-856.
2
Ibid
3
John 14: 6
4
Ibid 8: 32
5
Ibid 6: 37
1
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This normal rational Christian" whose thinking, feeling and
1
willing is to be that of Christ - has theilinindof Christll - and
whose end is his own moral perf'ect1tm, is not an abstraction
from the world in which he finds himself', butllunable to abide
2 3,,'
alone,1l he is to seek"first the Kingdom of God,n that Idea.l
society where all men are at once both means and ends, and at
the same time the society is also means and ends, Here the
conflict between man and society vanishes.
In Christ's view His Kingdom will be composed of per-
fect Christians. They will love themselves. This self-love
and self-respect was the standard of the Old Dispensation. The
Ideal standard, for Christ's own Kingdom is given in "A new Com-
mandment I give unto you that ye love one another even as I have,4
loved you ," a counsel of perfection th,at can never be ~ sur-
5
passed. Jesus loved his disciples as much as himself. His love
was that perfect love (Agape), a perf'ectly, intelligent good-
will. He treated m~n, not as automatons, but as rational free-
men, each endowed with powers for working with God. Each person
----"-"--~ ---
1I Corinthians 2: 16
2
JOPJl 12: 24
3
Matthew 6: 33
4
John 13: 34, 35
5
John 3: 1.6
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could imagine what he wanted to be and long for it, and approach
the fruition of that idea.
Such are to be the citizens of His Kingdom, an Ideal, g_
Perfect Kingdom, a.Socie~y, nowhere a.ctual1y realized fully upon
the earth, then or since. But in all its Ideal glory it has
worked persua.sively in the hearts of men through the centuries.
'I'oday,in spite of war and terror, in spite of all a.ttempts to
discredit and reject it, still it stands, mighty in its power,
as it works in each selt"-respeccing, rational man, whose indivi-
ua1 might is as the weight of the single rain drop, t'a LLf.ng on
the earth, whose cumulative force v{il1 eventually prove Lr-r-e sLst>
able.
The origins of Kant's "Kingdom of Ends" and the"Kingdom
of Go~lare apparently different. Jesus taught his idea. to the
common people in parables. The c ommon people heard Christ gladly,
llfor he spoke as one having authority, and not as the ac r-Lbes ;"
He spoke from his rational mind to theirs. Here was a message
that met the needs of the human heart, based upon the deepest
needs of their being, not lost in the limbo of the speculations
of later1theologians. Christ's teachings, strj_pped of these
speculations, are the teachings of a Rationa.l mind, speaking to
that rationality implanted in the human heart.
Kant, by means of reason and ratlonality, derived his
kingdom from man's moral nature. This he did by ana.lysing their
own minds for them. He showed them that the rational, normal
-...----. _._-------------------_._-_ .•---- ------
1
Matthew 7:29
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par-aon accepts the Golden Rule because he sees and understands
that its observance will sive him and others like him what
they all want - moral perfection. 'I'ha t way of looking at it
removes the blind obedience ofIlAuthorit'i'with a new and better
understanding of authority, an appreciate, joyous acceptance of
the Ideal, to be realized amongst them as far as they were able
to realize it ..
The "Kingdom of Ends," - the Kingdom of God - was not
thought of by Kant,in any respect, as being his own. He merely
removed it from the realm of the blind dogma tLsm of his day and
placed it in the field of"sweet reasonableness." By the sheer
force of reason he showed that; the Kingdom of God is the only
Kingdom where the conflict b et.wen the individual and the soci-
ety can be reconciled.
In thel1:Kingdomof Endsll Kant pictured the Ideal Kingdom
of God and likewise the Perfect Society where perfect moral per-
sons will find no conflict amongst themselves. For all of them
aLm at the same end. In so doing they at once become means, also
and thus there is a harmony of effort; conflict simply does not
\
exist in coterminus bodies. United organisms act 0.8 units and
in b.armony.. Not that there is a necessity for, or that it would
be desira.ble for everyone to do the same ope1"'a.tionin that King-
dom; rather they a.re like St. Paul's conception of the Church
of Christ, a Body with a Head, or Aim,or Ideal - embodied in
Jesus C:b..rist- ma de up of organs that are different, and which
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perform: di.fferent funct:1ons, which together ben ef'Lb each and
every member, and at the same time preserves the inter-relations
between the members. In that Kingdom no conflict enters or re-
mains.. From that Kingdom no one ever departs, for it is made
up of rational c1tizens, persons who know what they wanb and
know that herein is where they find what they want. Leaving it
would be defiance of a man's own san~ty. Rational, normal be-
ings, holy men, would never leave it.
True it is but an ideal, but, in saying that, let it be
remembered that ideals are not mere "visionary" things; while
they ~re in the minds of people yet they are far more than mere
i~agination.. It is a conception of reason. Kant connected his
law with the law of uniformity of nature. The whole universe
stands behind it and gua.r-an teea its validity. No where in na-
ture will man find any contradictions to the enunciation of the
principles of the Kingdom, nor to any subsidary rule, derived
logically from that principle. The Ideal here is Plato's Ideal,
the only Realities in the universe - that concept of pur-e reason
dr-awn from experience in this world, and toward which all chang-
ing human societies must tend. In all ages, in all men, univer-
sally and· eternally, that Ideal Society is working to bring men
to form societies more nearly like it. Mundane wars come and
peace may come, but this Ideal goes on f'or-e ver-, To eradicate
it ma.n must perish.
Evidence ths"t these eternal principles are r-ea.l,vital
and all powerful are abounding on every hand. The history of
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man is the living panorama of the struggle of men to achieve
higher and ever higher ideals. That civilizat:ton after civili-
zation has passed away has passed away only confirms the im-
possibility of man and society veing in conflict. Babylon,,...._
Egypt, Rome flourished and decayed because they were built on
shifting sands. Man was nothing,·· rene society every thing.
But the eternal urge to grow brought on successive civillzatlons,
each falling because they were not rooted in eternal principles.
Western civilization, which was stagnant and decaying, took form
and made the most rapid development in the annals of history,
when man became recognized as a focal point. Today, because the
"rugged individualist!! and the "adamant socialist!! are each
blinded to the component part of its nature, that civilization
is torn· and bleeding, fighting for its very existence.
In nature the story is the same; the rugged individualist,
the dinosaurs and all the rest of those who looked out only for
themselves have long since perished. Only those species which
have, in nature, followed the basic principles of the Kingdom,
to live and help live, sur-vfve , Only because the robin will and
does give its life for its young do we enjoy, today, the beauty
of' its song.
That men have been guided by and have followed, in part.
the principles of the Kingdom, gives ample proof of the power of
those principles to carr'y men on toward their goal of perfection.
From the Reformation. on, began the greatest period of develop-
ment the world bas ever known. Politically, socia1a11'1, and eco-
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nomically, with the renewed emphasis upon the ind:1.vidualand
his worth, in the eyes of God, came opportunities for man to
achieve, in part, the long pent up, imprisoned desires that had
been thwarted and had thus made life miserable for him for so
long a time.
Governments changed; ever more attention was given to
the rights and worth of the individual. This resulted, at last,
in the forming of Republics, based upon the basic concept that
government, the Society of State, was derived and made by the
11
people. In the words of the immortal Lincoln they were of the
people, by the people and for the people." Thus modern "Democra-
cies" grew out of the concepts of the Kingdom of God. Not a.s1s
so often claimed does Democracy make the Kingdom or Church pos-
sible, but rather the Kingdom and its recognition make Democracy
possible.
Socially, the gains were just as great and as far reach-
ing. The individual began to ha.ve a "place in the sun"; his
health, his education, his environmental conditions became more
and more a matter of concern. Hospitals, schools, health centers,
libraries, research for the extension of the span of life by re-
moval of di sease, Social 'Welfare agencies, all came into being,
but only in those lands where men were trying to approximate the
Ideal of the Kingdom.
Economically, the advance was just as great; the indivi-
dual began to share as never before in the products of his toil.
New methods of production, distribution, labor saving devices
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fOl" fa.ctory and home poured in, in an astouding avalanche of
new forms and uses. Here again it must be noted that these ad-
vances were greatest where the Principles of the Kingdom we~e
espoused most freely and not at all where they were un1mown.
That there wer-e those who were blinded as to how and
why these advances were made possible is of no moment. Neither
does it matter that ma.ny became greedy, grasping, "rugged indivil!i-
ualists" with no concern for the whole - interested only in their
own selfish aims. That mechanistic science destroyed, for those
who accepted it, the God of those who had spread the principles of
the Kingdom ( out of which all these advances had come) a.ndplaced
in its stead the I1Social Consciousness" - making a god out of it -
is of no lasting consequence. The rugged individualist has dug
his own grave and is reaping the whirlwind of his sowing. Mecha-
nistic science is gone; the god of the social consciousness has
been seen to be a mere idol of clay_ The remnants l'1nger on, it
is true, but out orethe turmoil the Truth and the eternal verity
of the principles of the Kingdom will rise again, for they are
al'ive tOday in the hearts of untold numbers. Implanted in man,
they cannot, they will not die. In what form the new day will
arise is unlL~own and unimportant. What. is important, what will
be of worth is that men have found,for themselves, a.nIdeal tha.t
lifts them, as individuals, into a society that rises above the
societies, the hybrid-societies in which he finds himself, into
that Society, the Kingdom of God, tha.t sha.ll some day encircle
the ea.rth.
I, i,
'rhus it is seen that a society !!l.t;tstbe one that; is com-
posed of'moral men - men, who in the making of' it, by the unity
of their purpose, produce, at once, a society that is cotermi-
nus with themselves, an end.and a means; thus every member at
once is also means and ends. The basis of the society is such
that there can be no possible conflict, f'or it rests upon the
"Dignltyll of each individual, his love, his self-respect, that
perf'ectly intelligent good will. Hence he is f'ree of all com-
pulSion, for he will never act contrary to his best interests,
and realizing that his own best interests are those of his fel-
lows, he never conflicts wi t11them.
Kant' s nKingdom of Erida" illus trates that such a societ·y
is the only necessary, absolute, final society that moral men
can live in. This society is like the Kingdom of God, and it
becomes apparent that the Kingd0I!l_of _Ggd_i~ th~ absolutely nec es-
sarx.,.t.only conceivable societv fol'"men.
It is apparent that man ha s, by following the inherent
, , ',. ~~.....-
l~.';.,:.~. tt'!J":'
needs fOillldwithin him, fo~q~~~ in a small way, many societies,
based upon the basic concept that the individual and the society
are coterminus and component parts of an organic whole. The home,
choirs, and kindred societies are an expression of that concept.
Moreover, man has, when only dimly and partially conscious of
those principles of the Kingdom, proceeded to make the greatest
advances recorded in the annals of history.
Slowly, scrnetimes painf'ully, man responds to the inherent
principles of the Kingdom implanted within him and as they change
the concepts of' the individual they irresistably emerge and effect
~---------------------------------------
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the entire strata of his world. The home, marriage, schools,
all social agencies, even to the State, are being cbanged to con-
form to the principles of the Kingdom of God. The price of mis-
takes man makes by taking only one sided, abstract views is one
of heart ache, and oft times may border on despair, but, though
the cost is high, man does learn, in fact is learning that the
Kingdom works within him. Looking beyond and above the elements
that seem to deny the ultimate victory, there looms a horizon fi.f
hope and conviction that men, seeking the best, responding to
the best, will more truly understand and enter into that Society,
the Kingdom 01' God., that absolutely necessary, that only conceiv-
able society for men, the seeking of which truly adds all other
necessary things to life.
--.,....-----.'-~ ---
THE INDIVIDUAL AND TIm lITNGDOM OF' GOD
CHAP'rER VI
Conclusion
Chapter One stated this thesis, the reconciliation of
the conflict between the individual and society.
Chapter Two defined a person. There the individual
person emerged a self conscious, self-directing organism, com-
posed of body, spirit (soul) and mind (consciousness) whose end
is his own.mo r-a.Lperfect:i.on.
In Chapter 'I'br-ee the free man was the unLt of'considera-
tion.. It was shown that persons, in the true sense of that word,
are only those who are rational, normal and moral. That morality
predicates f'reedom just as freedom does morality. The moral per-
son was shown to be that normal,rati.onal being who freely chooses
his own moral perfection as his end in life. The denial of free-
dom, and thus of'morality, by trw law of physical necessity and
by theological predestination was shown to be invalid. That there
is a cla.ss predestination, that final destinations are predicated
for those who choose certain ends, was freely a&nitted, but this
was shown to be a confirmation of the freedom of choice, rathel'
than denial. The Person emerged fl"'omthis chapter as a free
moral agent, with the ability to make choices, that marks him as
a person in the true sense of that word.
In Chapter Pour such persons form societies. The theory
which denies existence of the individual was shown to be built
upon foundations now discredited. Man, as an isolated being, is
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an,abstraction. Only then, placed in society and considered
as part of a whole, does he become a full man, for society and
:man cannot be separated, except for the purposes of descrip-
tiono Man and society ar-e coterm.inus and component parts of
the whole.
It was shown that societies are made by man to fulfill
their needs and ~.~ a part of him. A true society is a group
of two 01" more persons, gathered together in any way, for the
aCIlieving of any result that they cannot produce alone and
then add together. The end of the society must be spir:ttual
a.nd, ther-efore, the same as man's goal - his own moral perfec-
tion. In society, a man is at once means and an end, just as
society is a means and ende There is no conflict in society,
and it was shovm that only in hybrid-societies are there any
conflicts to be found, between moral members and others. The
need of'a universal society, to accomplish what the small, more
or less local, societies have done, remained apparent and the
ideal society - where each member entered freely, W9.S rational,
a moral being whose end was the end of each member ( his own
moral perfection) - was postulated.
In Chapter Five, Kant's "Kingdom of Ends, and the King-
dom of God, depicted by Jesus Christ, were studied to show how
they were one and the same, and how they do reconcile the con-
flict - that in the Kingdom of God the members are free moral
agents, that the;'Tstrive, each for their own and at the same
time for the moral perfection of their fellowsf that having the
same end they are morally one and that, therefore no conflict
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is po ssd.b'Le , Here the reconciliation was made" 1'lanwasplaced
in a societ~ ..where there is no conflict. Fina.lly, it wa.s
shown how the ideal of this Kingdom had ef:fected man, made hy-
brid-societies and elevated them to levels above any others
ever known, and that, in spite of turmoil all about, men sti1
belong to that Kingdom and are guided by it.
The contention of the thesis has been sustained. 'l"'he
conflict has been reconciled and from this study there are
several conclusions that become of appar-enb value in viewing
the world of today.
The first of these is the conclusion th..atin the world
situation we see, not a clash of economic forces, but a clash
of spiritual forces. It is a conflict that goes far beyond the
question of the n haves" and II have no ts" regardless of how impor-
tant that phase may be. The Totalitarian ideology is derived
? from the Hegelian concept of the ItWhole. Hegel took a universal
view and then proceeded to the particulars, but the Univers9.1
was not conceived as independent of the parts; 9.11were knit
together in a Unity. The taking of the partial view of his
concept has given rise to the view that the state 1s all in all,
a veritable God, and the concept of tl:eKingdom of God is that
the favored nation is to reduce, crush and make a world of sub-
servient slaves, who, having no real existence at all, and
having contributed trleir bit, perish.
Opposing this concept is that of Democracy which is,
today, a strange hybrid. On the one hand Democracy cla.ims the
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rights of the individual to be supr-ems, But the dominant phil-
osophy of Democracy is that built upon the theory of the"Social
Consciousness" ...society makes the man; he exists only because
of the state and when the state ceases he ceases to exist. There-
fore, in the world, a mighty conflict rages, to see which philos-
ophy shall predominate. In actuality both sides are striving at
the same ends; the conflict arises over meanse
'11he second conclusion is closely allied to that of the
first - namely, the controversy over the Individual and the So-
d_al Go speL, The proponents of the Individual Gospel are
blinded to the fact that man does not live alone, that he must
be a part of the world in which he lives. The adher-errts of the
Social Gospel make an equally fatal abstraction and deify the
society. They are interested only in making a political society
that will fit that peculiar abstraction. The evident and ob-
vious conclusion is that there is no Individual or80ci9.1 Gospel
and that there is just the plain, simple, llladorned Gospel of
Jesus CIJrist" While" Rome bur-na" each group 11 fiddles away" and
the very thing they both claim to desire is being bitterly and
harm:fully attacked. Only a consideration of both views and the
reconciling of'them into the original Unity will be of any avail.
The third and by far the most vital conclusion is that
man has with him the power to choose to st r-f.ve toward his goal
of perrection. The God who implanted that desire, gave rise to
"those needs of the human heart, made man "in his own image,
has given man a way of life, has defined the Society he longs
f'or, and today men are working in that society. They are trans
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cending the chaos about them, reaching forth to a new day that
can and will, inevitably be built a little more like the Eternal
verities than ever before~ Man 1s not dependent upon his hy-
brid-socd.eties. He can butld above them and as he does so will
blaze the path, enlightening the way for the ushering in of a
brighter tomorrow.
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